

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

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THESIS

**NATO: FROM CREATION TO GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY.
INSIGHTS FOR THE CZECH REPUBLIC.**

by

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June 1999

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THE CZECH REPUBLIC.**

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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines developments in NATO from 1949 to 1999 and discusses NATO's future role in the European security system. The thesis further discusses how particular groups of the Czech society perceive NATO.

Since 1949 NATO has developed into the most powerful and the most successful collective defense organization in the world. With the collapse of the communism, NATO had to adapt to the new situation to justify its existence. Since 1990 NATO has significantly changed and is quite different from the 1990 NATO. Today's NATO is actively conducting out-of-area missions, cooperating with former adversaries through the EAPC and the PfP-program, and supporting democracy throughout Europe; however, NATO is also looking for its future form, and for its place and role in the system of European security. The most likely form will be a collective defense organization within the framework of cooperative security system. There was only a lukewarm support to accession of the Czech Republic to NATO within Czech public. This was caused by the Czech historical experience and by the approach of Czechoslovak and later Czech governments to the national security matters since 1989, which resulted in insufficient public discussion on NATO issue in the 1997-99 period.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the Communist system in 1989, the disbanding of the Warsaw Treaty in 1991, and the end of the Cold War have heralded a new geopolitical system and a new Era of Stability on the Old Continent. However, the dramatic political changes, whose symbol has become the fall of the Berlin Wall, have brought unexpected conflicts to post-communist countries and Europe. These conflicts have shown that the peace and stability in Europe will not come to existence automatically, and the paths to them will be long, costly, and sinuous.

The new era has created a new security environment, where the principles and interests of several security organizations have intertwined. With the implosion of the Soviet Union and declining power of Russia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a collective defense organization might have seemed to lose a reason for its existence. "Some (analysts) optimistically see Europe as the wealthiest, most progressive, cooperative and secure region in the world. They see no real threat to Europe and believe that NATO no longer has a mission and will or should fade away."¹ In September 1990, long before the Warsaw Treaty disbanded, Eduard Shevardnadze, then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union declared that NATO and the Warsaw Treaty would become parts of all-European security structures and later would dissolve in them². Nonetheless, the course of events has not followed these predictions and has revealed that international organizations including the United Nations (UN) have not been prepared for the new challenges. During the Yugoslavia crisis, NATO proved to be the only organization capable of decisive action, moreover only under strong American leadership. It was the answer to theories of analysts, who were reasoning, in the idealistic euphoria of the end of Cold War and in expectation of the end of

¹ James W. Morrison, Jeffrey Simon, and Charles L. Barry, "Europe" in Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Van Tassel, ed. *American Defence Policy* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 523.

² David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 27.

realpolitik, for ceasing NATO's existence. NATO has been the only steady European structure disposing of sufficient military power to resolve concurrent European security problems and there has been no reason to disband the well-tried structure.

The questions about NATO and European security's future that have emerged since 1989 are of vital importance. What is NATO's future form? Will it be despite the Bosnia lessons a collective security organization? Or will NATO remain the collective defense body? What will be the manner of NATO's cooperation with such other European security organizations as Western European Union (WEU) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)? What role will European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) play? This thesis seeks answers to these questions not only in the current process of NATO transformation and enlargement but also in the NATO history.

The Czech Republic, with the reputation of being the most loyal ally of the Soviet Union only ten years ago, has achieved one of its foreign policy main objectives and de facto became a NATO member in December 1998, when the last NATO state approved enlargement. The Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs received NATO's Invitation Letter on January 29, 1999, and the Czech Republic will become officially a NATO member on March 12, 1999. The process of joining NATO has raised several questions about the Czech Republic's way of achieving NATO membership. Were the NATO issues discussed enough in public by the elites? How is the NATO issue perceived and interpreted in the Czech Republic in particular social layers and groups? The thesis will answer these questions by analyzing relevant publications and official documents.

The second chapter briefly summarizes the Cold War NATO history and focuses on the essentials in past debates about NATO policy and enlargements. The third chapter discusses the post-Cold War NATO policy, NATO's new roles, and the circumstances of NATO enlargement. The fourth chapter examines NATO's future role in the frame of interlocking institutions – Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the OSCE, the European Union (EU), Council of Europe, and the WEU. Also, the ESDI's function is discussed. The fifth chapter discusses two aspects of the path of the Czech Republic to NATO: the

manner the NATO issue has been discussed in public, and how it is perceived and interpreted in policymakers circles, military and public.

Peacekeeping function of NATO is not being presented here; it is such a broad topic that it could not be satisfactorily examined in this thesis.

II. NATO HISTORY 1949 - 1989

A. INTRODUCTION

The circumstances of NATO's coming into existence have their roots in history. Statesmen have tried to create a peaceful international order in Europe for centuries. The first attempt that successfully secured peace for a longer period was the Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815. The second one, too complicated to be stable, was its modification by Bismarck at the end of 1870s. The third one came in the years 1907-1914.³ While these attempts were great power alliances geographically limited to Europe, two following ones, the League of Nations of 1920, and the UN of 1945 have been intended to be collective security organizations whose main purpose have been the maintaining of peace all over the world. The League of Nations was not a viable system – even the “founding nation” USA resisted to take part in - and broke within twenty years. The UN, the most ambitious project, is surviving, but fulfilling of the main task has been far from success. Another kind of a security system is collective defense. There were several unsuccessful attempts to build up collective defense organizations in Europe. For example, on August 14, 1920, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia signed the “Little Entente”, a pact intended to counter the German dominance. NATO has been the most successful collective defense system in history.

There are fundamental differences between the terms “collective security” and “collective defense.” Collective security is based on the principle “security is indivisible” and implies that the security of all member states of the system is endangered by any threat to the security of any member state of the system. In ideal case the world consists of only one integral group of states in which danger may be posed by one of them (i.e. by “law-breakers” from inside the system) and must be met by all of them.⁴

³ Gordon A. Craig, Alexander L. George, *Force and Statecraft* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 28.

⁴ This is only the most basic feature of the collective security system. For detailed studies on security systems see for instance Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York: Random House, 1962). For analysis of the current issues of the collective European security see for example James E. Goodby, “Can Collective Security Work? Reflections on the European Case,” in Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson, with Pamela Aall, eds., *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996).

In the collective defense case, the alliance is set to meet external threats to its members, and they are not obliged to take action against aggression act against non-allies.

As Yost put:

Collective security involves pact against war; the threat is aggression by a currently unidentified party to the pact, which should ideally include all the states in the state system. In contrast, a collective defense pact binds together an alliance of states to deter and, if necessary, defend against one or more identifiable external threats, a state or a group of states outside the alliance.⁵

Since 1945 historians have argued as to who was more responsible for political development after World War II - whether Stalin who declared in 1946 that international peace was impossible "under the present capitalist development of the world economy" or Truman who adopted an unnecessarily belligerent stance.⁶

While traditionalists accuse the Soviet Union of being totalitarian, revisionists maintain the Soviet threat was not real. They argue the Truman administration exaggerated this threat in order to gain the public and congressional support for their major policies of containment, and that this started the process that later led to anti-Communist hysteria and McCarthyism. Craig has illustrated this point quoting Dean Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State, who admitted in his memoirs that he had "consciously denigrated Soviet intentions and portrayed Russia as aiming at world domination in order to gain approval for the president's Policies."⁷

Be that as it may, the period between the end of World War II in 1945 and the end of the Cold War⁸ was one of the most dangerous parts of the world history. The mankind was facing the threat of nuclear war, which would have not had a winner and would have probably doomed the civilization.

⁵ Yost, 7.

⁶ George B. Tindall, David E. Shi, *America: A Narrative History* (W.W.Norton & Company, Inc., 1996), 1299.

⁷ Craig, 116.

⁸ Craig has written: "Cold War is a descriptive term that was generally adopted in the late forties to characterize the hostile relationship that developed between the West and the Soviet Union. While loosely employed, the term had an exceedingly important connotation: it called attention to the fact that, however acute their rivalry and conflict, the two sides were pursuing it by means short

On April 4, 1949 twelve countries from Northern America and Western Europe signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D.C. Within five months, it was ratified by the parliaments of the member countries.

The postwar world that took shape after 1945 fit close to the visions of Churchill and Stalin. The Soviet Union and the United States divided Europe into two spheres of influence. The Iron Curtain divided former Allies.

This chapter discusses the circumstances under which NATO was established, its Cold War role and policies, and the changes in security environment brought by the collapse of the communism.

1. 1945-1949 Development

There were signs of trouble in the Grand Alliance as early as the spring of 1945, as the Soviet Union set up compliant governments in Poland and Romania, violating the Yalta promises of democratic elections.⁹ The Soviet Union did not demobilize and maintained approximately thirty divisions in Eastern Europe. While the strength of American and British forces in Europe was no more than 880,000 in 1946, the strength of the Soviet Union forces was still about six million men¹⁰. Question is to which extent the Soviet hesitation to demobilize was caused by a probable revelation of Churchill's plan *The Unthinkable* that proposed the attack on the Red Army in Europe as early as on July 1, 1945 by British and American forces together with ten Polish and ten mobilized German divisions¹¹. During 1947 and 1948, the Soviet Union gained control over governments in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, and supported communist movements in Turkey and Greece. Churchill addressed the political development in

if another war and that, it was hoped, they will continue to do so. As some commentators noted, however bad the Cold War was, it was better than a hot one, and few would deny that the Cold War was an acceptable substitute for a thermonuclear war with the Russians, if that indeed were the only alternative." (p. 117).

⁹ Tindall, 1299.

¹⁰ *The NATO, Fact and Figures* (NATO Information Service, 1989), 4.

¹¹ Světová válka právě skončila, když Churchill plánoval další (*Mladá fronta*, October 10, 1998, Praha).

his 1946 Fulton speech; "This is certainly not the liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor it is one which contains the essentials of permanent peace."¹²

Western leaders realized that "In 1945...communism seemed to offer a rational answer to the disorder and disarray of capitalism and democracy in postwar Europe. The model the Soviet Union showed to the West, however, was that of a new oppressor, as the Soviets remained in Germany and in Eastern Europe after the war."¹³ The winter 1946-47 brought the lack of food, jobs, heating fuel and no hope to Europe, and communism as a possible solution to the failure of democratic capitalism. As Kaplan has written, "And as the Soviets strengthened their hold on the western borders, communism in Western Europe appeared prepared to take over more than just the Soviet Union's immediate neighbors."¹⁴

Kay has succinctly described the situation in the postwar Europe:

Western Europe was so economically devastated and militarily weak that it could not balance Soviet power alone. Economic disaster, fragile democracies, and disrupted populations also made the West European states susceptible to internal Soviet-backed communist influence and demobilizing nationalism. At the same time, the US was dramatically reducing its troop presence in Europe, and those troops that remained had low combat potential. The US position in Western Europe was especially tenuous because the Americans were unable to send more than a division anywhere without resorting to partial mobilization. As a result, the entire defense of Western Europe relied on American air power and its nuclear component.¹⁵

After World War, Great Britain was unable to act as a stabilizing factor on the continental balance of power. It influenced the situation in Greece, where the pro-Western government waged war against a communist insurrection. When Great Britain announced it could not afford to support the Greek monarchy any longer, the United States gave hand. Kay has written:

¹² Yost, 35.

¹³ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 6.

¹⁴ Ibid., 12.

¹⁵ Sean Kay, *NATO and the Future of European Security* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 13.

The US responded with the Truman Doctrine¹⁶, announced on 12 March 1947 in a presidential address to Congress. President Harry S. Truman specifically promised American aid to Greece and Turkey, based on extending the universal principles of freedom, democracy, and peace. In June, US Secretary of State George Marshall announced a plan of economic assistance for Western Europe designed to prevent the rise of nationalism, promote democracy, and establish economic containment of the Soviet Union. The Marshall Plan implicitly recognized the growing convergence between interdependence, stability, and security. With the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the US entered a gradual process of institutionalizing regional commitments intended to promote security in areas understood to be vital to its national interest.¹⁷

George F. Kennan, counselor of the American embassy in Moscow, described the roots of Russian policy in his 8,000-word dispatch that he sent to the secretary of state in 1946, and gave name to the US policy in his famous anonymous 1947 article published in *Foreign Affairs*. There he wrote, "the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."¹⁸ The American administration accepted Kennan's ideas and used them as a bottomline for containment, a new direction in US foreign policy.

However, the Soviet Union was not considered the only security threat in Europe. The free European states exhausted by the war sought guarantees for their security. On March 4, 1947 France and Britain concluded the Treaty of Dunkirk, which provided for mutual military assistance in case of German aggression within a 50-year period.

In December 1947 the London Conference of Foreign Ministers primarily concerning the settlement of divided Germany completely failed, which could be understood as a moment of decision for Western leaders, feared for a potential communist threat from East, to establish an alliance that would pool the military strengths of the West.

On January 22, 1948 Ernest Bevin, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, announced in the House of Commons that five countries, namely Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and

¹⁶ Tillman has written that the Truman Doctrine marked at least an open acknowledgment of the Cold War, a contest given this name by Bernard Baruch in his 1947 speech to the legislature of South Carolina. (Tindall, 1302.)

¹⁷ Ibid., 14-15.

¹⁸ Tindall, 1301.

Luxembourg, would propose a political alliance that would eventually be opened to other European countries in time. On March 17, 1948 the initiative resulted in the signing of the Brussels Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural collaboration and Collective self-defense, whose main objective was the economic recovery of Europe. In Article 1, the parties committed themselves to organize and coordinate their economic activities to produce the best possible results. A military core of the treaty was in Article 4, which obligated parties to afford the party attacked "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." However, any defense arrangement without the United States was inadequate to the power of the Soviet Union. The western leaders were aware of this fact. The Brussels Treaty thus was a framework for an institution with an American security guarantee,¹⁹ which at that time did not exist.

The United States supported the pact, but, due to continuing strong isolationism at home, the administration did not associate publicly with its formation.²⁰ At first, Truman needed to gain both public and congressional support for his new policy towards the Soviet Union.

One week after signing the Brussels Treaty, American, British, and Canadian officials started secret talks on the possibility of creating a transatlantic institution based on either the Brussels Pact or the Rio Treaty. Official negotiations among the US, Canada, and the Brussels Pact states began in Washington D.C. on July 6, 1948.²¹

The main objectives of this transatlantic Alliance were to support the policy of containment of Communism, especially of the Soviet Union, and to prevent a possible future German threat. Presence of the American military power in Europe was the only way how to achieve both of them. As Lord Ismay, the first NATO Secretary General, has reportedly quipped, "NATO's purpose was to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and hold the Germans down." Indeed, post-War Europe was afraid of Germany. France

¹⁹ Kaplan, 17.

²⁰ Ibid., 20.

²¹ Kay, 20.

considered Germany to be a threat to European security most of all the NATO members. The German factor played an important role in French policy and caused a lot of troubles inside NATO.

This fear led to the Dunkirk Treaty, and was also the main reason for the Netherlands to sign the Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. As Gillingham has written, "... terrified that the Germans might ally with the Soviets, mistrustful of the French, and disappointed by the British, the Low Countries had no real choice other than somehow to interest the United States in their security.... To the Netherlands, NATO, or something resembling it would have been necessary to contain the Germans even without a Soviet threat."²²

France signed the Dunkirk Treaty, and needed American military support. Firstly, France wanted forward defense on the Rhine in the case of the Soviet attack. Secondly, her non-Communist government needed military alliance with the USA because of the internal threat created by the French communists. As Wall has said, "The (French) Communists counted on two things: misery and fear. The Marshall Plan had dealt with the first; a corresponding military alliance was necessary to eliminate the second."²³

Britain was most responsible for enticing the United States in Europe.²⁴ The British stressed most the Soviet military threat. Foot has maintained that Ernest Bevin had succeeded in working American fears of Communism into defenses of Britain²⁵.

Canada insisted on principle of general security, which was later included in Article 2 Treaty. Also, Canadians wanted a political foundation of the Alliance that would provide a positive alternative to communism, deepen the transatlantic integration, and promote cultural cooperation. Such a system,

²² Francis H. Heller, John R. Gillingham, eds., *NATO: The Founding Of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe*, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1992), 2-3.

²³ Irwin M. Wall, *France and the North Atlantic Alliance*, in Heller, 48.

²⁴ Heller, 3.

²⁵ Peter Foot, *Britain, European Unity and NATO, 1947-1950*, in Heller, 62.

according to a Canadian representative, would not disappear when the danger is removed, and should have a positive, not only a negative purpose.²⁶

In the United States, the Senate adopted the so-called Vandenberg Resolution on June 11, 1948, which made a US participation in a peacetime alliance with European nations possible, and which requested a strict compliance of the treaty to the UN Charter. Moreover, as Kay has written:

The Vandenberg Resolution stressed that American association with regional and other collective arrangements must be "based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." By this clause Vandenberg sought to ensure that the Europeans would be producers, and not solely consumers, of security.²⁷

One year of difficult highly secret negotiations²⁸ resulted in signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington D.C. on April 4, 1949 by the twelve nations.²⁹ The differences in the negotiators' attitudes indicated the problems, which NATO would have to solve in the future. These were, for example, the Suez crisis and the Hungarian uprising in 1956, the French withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structures, and the crisis about the twilling of MC 14/3 in the 1980s. The "NATO spirit"³⁰, however, that came into existence during negotiations in 1948-49 gave the hope that NATO would be able to solve successfully all the forthcoming problems.

2. Main Objectives of NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty "institutionalized a balance-of-power security arrangement and reflected a growing sense of a transatlantic community among those who crafted the institutional form."³¹

²⁶ Kay, 24.

²⁷ Ibid., 22.

²⁸ Ibid., 30.

²⁹ Fourteen nations were invited, but Sweden has remained neutral, and demands of the Republic of Ireland were unacceptable. Dublin would have joined the negotiations only as representatives of a united Ireland. (Ibid., 28)

³⁰ Style of formal and informal multilateral consultations, which made possible to reach mutual long-term gains at expenses of short-term national ones.

³¹ Kay, 30.

The preamble commits the members "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law" and expresses their dedication to the principles of the UN Charter.

The heart of the Treaty is Article 5 that provides, under Article 51 of the UN Charter, the security guarantee to the members. It says that "(The Parties agree) ... an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them... will assist the Party or Parties attacked... including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." Nevertheless, Article 5 does not commit the Parties to the automatic response. As Acheson has explained:

(Our promises) were to regard an attack on any of our allies as an attack on ourselves and to assist the victim ourselves and with the others, with force if necessary, to restore peace and security.... This did not mean that we would be automatically at war if one of our allies were attacked. We should and would act as a nation in accordance with our promises – not in repudiation of them – and, as a nation, 'that decision will rest where the Constitution has placed it.'³²

Article 4 commits the Parties to consult together "the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." Article 2 expresses the Canadian demand for the principle of general security. It makes the treaty more than only a military alliance, because it creates the basis for economic cooperation and expresses also social objectives of the Parties. Article 2 was also an obstacle during the talks. Acheson has stated that " (The article) got us into cultural, economic, and social cooperation. The senators were strongly opposed. Our senators saw Article 2 threatening our treaty.... for no important benefit."³³ Article 3 is a formula for burden sharing. This article was to make the Europeans to carry a certain part of financial burden of European security. They were supposed to do their best to defend themselves. In Article 7, the Parties state that the Treaty does not affect "the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security."

³² Donald Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: Matthew B. Ridgway, Doubleday & Company, 1969), 283.

³³ *Ibid.*, 277.

B. DEVELOPMENTS IN ALLIANCE'S POLICY

The Cold War was a kind of primitive "international system", where certain restraints and norms of nations' behavior were being followed. The only common major objective³⁴ of the two opposite poles of this system, namely the avoidance of thermonuclear conflict, was, as Craig wrote, "coupled with mutual fears that *any* shooting war between American and Soviet forces, no matter at how modest a level initially, could escalate."³⁵ That was the reason why both sides deeply stressed effective solutions of emerging crises. Crisis management has become an important means of maintaining the international system. Another important means was the policy of deterrence. After the Cuban crisis, other means including arms control, crisis prevention and accommodation, and economic cooperation "regulating rivalry and promoting some cooperation"³⁶ were employed.

The Alliance has been adjusting its defense policy since its establishment. The basic concept has been the one of deterrence, which is based on the idea that the costs of aggression would far outweigh the aggressor's gains. In early NATO years the deterrence means were nuclear weapons, and, in 1949, the strategy of rapid and massive nuclear retaliation anchored in the NATO document MC 14/1. At that time, the nuclear means were thought to be the only way how to offset the Soviet superiority in conventional forces in Europe.

1. Establishment of Military Structures

During the first several years of its existence, NATO had no fully implemented and established military structures and no real means of mobilizing against a possible Soviet attack in Europe. The existing organs were mostly political in nature: the North Atlantic Council, a Defense Committee responsible for

³⁴ Craig has maintained that there are threefold requirements of viable international system: agreed aims, appropriate structure, and commonly accepted modalities (Craig, 117).

³⁵ Craig, 117 - 118.

³⁶ Ibid., 118.

defenses planning, and a Military Committee as a NAC's council body³⁷. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, American war hero, was appointed the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) in 1950. The situation was changed with the Korean War. The North Korean forces were allegedly supported by the Soviet Union, and politicians, particularly German Chancellor Adenauer, were worried that the Soviet Union would attempt to unify Germany in the same way as the Communists were going to do in Korea. Concerns led to the final establishing of a military command structure under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. In 1952 the building up of military structure for twenty five to thirty divisions stationed in Central Europe was approved at the NATO meeting in Lisbon. Because of problems with the coordination of the multilateral defense planning process, NATO created an international political and military bureaucracy.³⁸

2. 1952 and 1955 Enlargements

In 1952 Turkey and Greece and in 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany became members of NATO. Although Turkey and Greece were the focus of the Truman Doctrine and thus the part of the policy of containment, they were not invited to become the members of the Alliance in 1949. As Kay has stated:

A number of strategic and political objections to Greek and Turkish membership were raised at NATO's founding by the negotiators. Central to these arguments were concerns about over extending NATO's defense into the Middle East and up to the Caucasian border of the Soviet Union. Neither country could really be considered "Atlantic." Moreover, as Greeks were Orthodox Christians and Turks Islamic, some founding members argued that neither country was representative of the early allied understanding of the Atlantic community. Finally, Britain was more interested in creating a separate alliance in the Mediterranean that would look toward the Middle East.³⁹

³⁷ Kay, 36.

³⁸ Ibid., 36.

³⁹ Ibid., 50-51.

The entrance of Greece and Turkey into NATO was facilitated by the changes in the strategic environment of the early 1950s. Whatever the military contribution of these countries has been, their disputes have caused serious problems to the Alliance.⁴⁰

The first attempt to involve Germany in the European defense failed when the French Assembly did not even vote on the issue of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954.⁴¹ Several months later the German accession to the amended Brussels Treaty and its Western European Union became the vehicle for bringing Germany into NATO. At the October 1954 Paris Meeting, in order to allay concerns over Germany rearmament both in Germany and in neighboring countries, West Germany committed itself not to manufacture atomic, chemical, and biological weapons on its soil; guided missiles; warships; and long-range bombers, except at the request of NATO. Also, West Germany obligated itself not to use force to unify Germany⁴². On January 1, 1958 NATO was reinforced with the first German division assigned.

3. Three Wise Men's Report and Political Consultation

On December 13, 1956 the NAC approved the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation.⁴³ The most important recommendations of the report were that member governments were to inform the NAC "of any development significantly affecting the Alliance so that effective political consultation could be held on the action to be taken," and in case that disputes among members could not be settled directly in accordance with Article 1 of the Treaty, they should be submitted to good offices procedures within NATO. Secretary General was empowered, with the consent of the parties to initiate

⁴⁰ Both countries have several times been on the brink of conflict. The most serious disputes have occurred over Cyprus and several islands in the Aegean Sea. Although NATO has striven for solution of the conflicts between its two members, no significant results have been achieved. The U.S. diplomacy has been more successful; however, the countries' relationships have still been hostile. Details see Kay, 50-54.

⁴¹ European members of NATO should have created a special military force under new supreme command, with its own staff system under the direction of European minister of defense. German contingent should become part of the forces. (Kaplan, 45.)

⁴² Kay, 55.

⁴³ It includes political, economic, and cultural cooperation.

procedures to settle such disputes. Furthermore, NATO improved its organizational structure. The meeting also adopted a resolution about the peaceful settlement of disputes, and about differences between member countries, and a resolution about nonmilitary cooperation in NATO.⁴⁴

a. Political Consultations

The need for increased consultations arose primarily from the necessity to prevent conflicts outside the NATO area that included the NATO members, and which had a negative impact on the cohesion of the Alliance. Such conflicts occurred in 1954 when the United States made a strategic profit in Indochina when the French withdrew after Dien Bien Phu, and especially during the 1956 Suez crisis.

Kay has written, "Consultation and consensus became the primary decision-making procedures in NATO. Each was essential to alliance cohesion and became institutionalized over time." Nevertheless, these procedures suffered from many problems: even the closest allies hesitated to share information on sensitive issues; primarily national interests were pushed during consultations that were also time-consuming; national bureaucracies could delay or block collective actions.⁴⁵ Moreover, NATO's formal political structures were designed to make expertise and recommendations, not decisions. The decisions were made either by the foreign ministers of the nations, or, at the Council-in-permanent-session, on behalf of each government by national ambassadors in the NAC. Political consultations were useful for both larger and smaller states. Both bargaining and coercive strategies were more successful, when the parties knew each other's position. In this environment, Kay has written, "the most effective form of consultation that developed in NATO was informal"⁴⁶

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁴⁵ Kay, 36-37.

⁴⁶ There have developed two kinds of consultations at NATO: "Hallway negotiations" and weekly lunches. (Kay, 38-39.)

b. Sputnik

In mid-1950s the Soviet Union tried to conduct policy of "disengagement," but this was not accepted by the United States and NATO at the Geneva Four Powers summit. On October 4, 1957 the Soviets announced the successful launching of the first earth satellite. It also was the announcement of the Soviet nuclear means carrier capabilities. Khrushchev coined the intercontinental ballistic missile "the ultimate weapon."⁴⁷ The NATO answer was a deployment of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe and an increasing scientific cooperation within NATO to overcome this "scientific gap."⁴⁸

4. Toward Harmel Report, Flexible Response and Détente

Sputnik was the final proof that the American invulnerability was over. Question arose whether the United States would be willing to use nuclear weapons to defend Europe at the risk of destruction of their own cities. John F. Kennedy's Administration developed a new American flexible response strategy that was later endorsed by President Lyndon Johnson. In this situation, the control of nuclear weapons became an issue in NATO. Disputes led to the French withdrawal from the military structures of NATO.

Situation was completely different from the one NATO had faced fifteen years ago. The changes led Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel to urge NATO in 1964 to reevaluate its objectives. NATO ministers accepted his assessment, and commissioned a study group to deal with the matter. The December 1967 Brussels NAC, the first one in the new Alliance headquarters,⁴⁹ approved the report *The Future Tasks of the Alliance*, the *Harmel Report*. This document called for "effective détente," and inspired disarmament and Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations.⁵⁰ The report concluded:

⁴⁷ Kaplan, 75.

⁴⁸ Effected by Sputnik, the December 1957 Paris NAC decided to establish the NATO Science Committee. This was the first step to broaden consultation in the spirit of the "Three Wise Men's Report."

⁴⁹ The headquarters were moved from France which withdrew from NATO's military structures in 1966.

⁵⁰ Kaplan., 109.

Military security and policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary. Collective defense is a stabilizing factor in world politics. It is the necessary condition for effective policies directed towards a greater relaxation of tensions. The way to peace and stability rests in particular on the use of the Alliance constructively in the interests of détente.⁵¹

The December 1967 Brussels NAC also approved the flexible response doctrine in the MC 14/3 document (MC 14/3: "Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area"). In this doctrine, the importance of conventional forces was emphasized; however, the nuclear deterrence remained. The defense reaction was supposed to be appropriate to the level of force used by an aggressor from the East. The response would have ranged from the conventional defense through the first use of nuclear weapons to a general nuclear response.⁵²

NATO went through an uneasy period between 1957 and 1967. The European Allies were afraid of losing American nuclear protection. This tendency was especially strong in France. In 1958 General De Gaulle proposed the triumvirate of the United States, Great Britain and France that would have controlled the use of nuclear weapons. This proposal was turned down. France later built up its own nuclear forces without any help. In 1963, Germany and France signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. At the same time, France vetoed British membership in the European Economic Community. The disputes between France and the United States within NATO culminated in 1966 when France announced its withdrawal from the NATO military structures.

During this period, NATO had to adapt both the policies and the structures. In 1961, the NATO deterrence policy was modified by the MC 14/2 document. Under the new rules, deterrence was provided with conventional forces; however, the Alliance reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in massive retaliation.

⁵¹ Kay, 44.

⁵² Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus* (London: Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries, 1997), 8.

At the NAC held between 4 – 6 May 1962 in Athens, foreign ministers and defense ministers adopted the Athens Guidelines, a document outlining in general terms nuclear means' use. Nuclear powers, Britain and the United States, have been obliged to consult with the Allies, "time and circumstances permitting," before they would release their nuclear weapons for use.⁵³

In the early 1960s, the Alliance deliberated on the Norstad Plan for Multilateral Force (MLF), later for the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) that would have led to NATO becoming the fourth nuclear power. This plan has never been realized.⁵⁴

In 1963 the Alliance established the Defense Planning Committee (DPC)⁵⁵ with primary responsibility for military affairs. On December 14, 1966 the DPC established the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)⁵⁶ that resolved NATO nuclear consultation. France was not represented in any of them.

Another factor that contributed to détente in Europe was Willy Brandt's German *Ostpolitik*. The policy was brought by the transformed Social Democratic Party (SPD). The transformation occurred in two steps. Firstly, in 1959 SPD officially disavowed "scientific Marxism". Secondly, in 1960 the party changed its attitude to Adenauer's foreign policy. This shift in SPD's policies diminished gaps between SPD and CDU/CSU and in 1966 made possible a Grand Coalition government of the CDU/CSU and SPD under Kurt-Georg Kiesinger (as Chancellor) and Willy Brandt. Though officially supporting Adenauer's policies, SPD developed its "policy of small steps," that was the basis for *Ostpolitik*⁵⁷ fully introduced when Willy Brandt became the Chancellor.

⁵³ *The NATO Fact and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989), 216.

⁵⁴ Kaplan, 92

⁵⁵ The DPC is normally composed of Permanent Representatives, but it meets at the level of Defense Ministers at least twice a year to deal with most defense issues related to collective defense planning. (*NATO Handbook*, 38.)

⁵⁶ The NPG consists of The Defense Ministers, members of the DPC. They meet regularly to discuss specific policy issues related to nuclear forces. (*NATO Handbook*, 38.)

⁵⁷ Walter F. Hahn, *Between Westpolitik and Ostpolitik: Changing West German Security Views* (Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1975), 24-6.

5. Committee on Challenges of Modern Society: the Third NATO's Dimension

At the April 1969 Washington NAC meeting President Nixon proposed the Allies to establish the Committee on Challenges of the Modern Society (CCMS). The objective of the CCMS was to explore ways in which "the experience and resources of the Western nations could most effectively be used to improve the quality of life in the Allied countries."⁵⁸ The United States proposal characterized this work as the third dimension of NATO, a societal dimension, that would enhance NATO's first (military) and second (political) dimensions. The proposal put together main objectives of both the Three Wise Men's and the Harmel Reports. The former was concerned with the internal cohesion of the Alliance; the latter was looking for Alliance's contribution to détente and global stability. Campbell has written:

The CCMS seemed to offer three advantages: solutions to the social and technological problems beginning to command domestic attention in some of the Allied countries, particularly the United States; expansion of NATO consultations into new areas, as the Three Wise Men's Report had called for thirteen years earlier; and the opening for the Alliance in its relations with non-NATO and particularly eastern European states, as called for by the Harmel Report.⁵⁹

The U.S. initiative was undoubtedly influenced by serious domestic problems. The United States was experiencing difficult period at home. There were race riots, an increase of violence in the society, and a growing awareness of environmental problems. Campbell has stated:

The fear was greater for the very reason that these crises were created by the normal, accepted economic behavior which had until then been an unquestioned part of American life. If the activities of daily life in a modern industrial society could destroy whole species, cause serious health problems, and make urban areas both unpleasant and dangerous in which to live, the entire philosophy on which the society was built was brought into question. Nothing in American historical experience had prepared the country to deal with what appeared to be a wholesale rejection of its values. ... It was nevertheless natural that the United States, simultaneously under attack at home and abroad for both its foreign and domestic policies, should turn to the countries with which it shared a common heritage and many common problems. It was natural that it looked to

⁵⁸ Edwina S. Campbell, *Consultation and Consensus in NATO: Implementing the Canadian Article* (University Press of America, 1985), 39.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 40.

a forum where frank but friendly talk had been the rule rather than the exception for twenty years.⁶⁰

The CCMS succeeded to establish a program to halt environmental degradation several years before it would have been achieved otherwise. In the other institutions, the governments were not obliged to act. CCMS required them to respond. The program and its pilot studies are opened to both non-NATO member states and individuals. Thanks to CCMS, mutual understanding has been often achieved among those responsible for energy/environment policies in NATO countries. It has helped to overcome many problems and to keep discussions going without higher tension.⁶¹ The CCMS became an important forum for consultations both within and outside the Alliance. Campbell has concluded that "CCMS cannot give NATO a new image. It can contribute to the only image worth having, that of internal strength and determination, through its contribution to the gradual development of political consultations."⁶²

6. The End of the Cold War

The policy inspired by the Harmel Report was designed to bring about more stable international relations at the lower levels of military forces and armaments through arms control agreements and confidence-building measures.

The turning point in the relations between East and West was the 1972 summit between President Nixon and Soviet leader Brezhnev. At this meeting, both statesmen announced a change in their policies. The world finally came to "détente."

⁶⁰ Ibid., 43-44.

⁶¹ Ibid., 165-86.

⁶² Ibid, 186.

Signing of the Helsinki Final Act on August 1, 1975, which completed the meeting of 35 nations of the CSCE, and which set new standards for discussion on human rights, introduced measures to increase mutual confidence between East and West.⁶³

A significant event occurred in March 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party. His policy changed the East-West relations. His policy towards the satellites of the Soviet Union's gave them another impetus to liberalization, and made all the changes in Eastern Europe possible.⁶⁴ According to Adam Ulam, "the Soviet/Communist collapse was brought about by Gorbachev's policies.... Had somebody other than Gorbachev been elected as the chief Communist boss in 1985, it is quite possible we would still be dealing with the Soviet Union as a superpower⁶⁵."

The Cold War era concluded when American President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at their summit meeting on December 3, 1989 declared that the Cold War was over.⁶⁶

In order to survive the changes in security environment; NATO had to change itself. The following chapter focuses on the process of NATO transformation between 1989 and 1999.

⁶³ *NATO Handbook* (NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998), 59.

⁶⁴ There were many factors that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, among them economic mismanagement and exhaustion and atrophy of ideological legitimacy; however, the Gorbachev's attempt to reform the regime has been recognized as the decisive one by many scholars (Yost, 42-43.).

⁶⁵ Adam Ulam quoted in Yost, 43.

⁶⁶ Wijk, 9.

III. POST COLD WAR DEVELOPMENT

A. INTRODUCTION

After 1989 disintegration of the world communist system happened abruptly and quickly. In Europe, the satellite states of the Soviet Union and its successors began to embark on a long and difficult road to democratic societies, leading through enormous economical, legislative, and political changes. Politicians were calling for a new European security system embracing the whole continent. Václav Havel, President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, predicted in his speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on May 10, 1990 that "NATO could become the seed of a new European security system."⁶⁷

On February 25, 1991 the military structure of the Warsaw Treaty dissolved in Budapest and on July 21, 1991 the Warsaw Pact disbanded in Prague. December 21, 1991 has become the date of dissolving the NATO's historical opponent. The Soviet Union ceased its existence.

Viewed historically, alliances have been established to deal temporarily with changing conditions. After accomplishing their tasks, they tend to disband. This chapter examines why NATO has survived the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the main reason for its existence, and summarizes the debates about and development in NATO policies after the Cold War till 1998.

B. FROM HAND OF FRIENDSHIP TO ENLARGEMENT

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.

Article 10, North Atlantic Treaty
April 4, 1949

⁶⁷ Gerald B. Solomon, *The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997: Blessings of Liberty* (New York: Praeger, 1998), 7.

March 12, 1999 was the date when one period of the NATO history was concluded. Three former adversaries, former members of the Warsaw Treaty, became members of NATO. This step followed several years of deliberating the pros and cons of the enlargement and its impacts on the future of global security.

In 1989 the Communist system was collapsing. In order to survive principal internal NATO changes and changes of its policies became vital. The May 1989 NATO Summit adopted two important documents. First, a declaration on the fortieth anniversary of the Alliance, which set out the main objectives and policies of the NATO Allies for the next decade. It recognized changes in Eastern Europe and outlined the Alliance's approach to its long-term objective of shaping a just and peaceful European order. Second, a Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament was agreed upon.⁶⁸

In 1989 the Warsaw Treaty still existed and it was not only the Soviet Union that wanted to preserve it. In October, Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser to President Carter, declared, "that termination of the two alliances would contribute to anarchy."⁶⁹

In December 1989 U.S. Secretary of State James Baker seemed indifferent as to which type of security organization the Eastern European countries would choose. He confirmed that regardless of future security relationships of these countries, NATO "will continue to provide Western governments the optimal instrument to coordinate their efforts at defense and arm controls, and to build a durable European order of peace."⁷⁰ Yet, within a year, NATO leaders realized that since the environment had changed, the Alliance had to react. On July 5-6, 1990, at the London summit, they declared that the Alliance had to "extend the hand of friendship" to former adversaries.

At the November 1990 CSCE Paris Summit Meeting three important documents were signed. On November 19 the Warsaw Treaty and NATO members signed the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in

⁶⁸ Ibid., 60.

⁶⁹ Solomon, 8.

⁷⁰ J.Baker cited in Solomon, 9.

Europe (CFE)⁷¹ and the Joint Declaration of the Twenty-Two States that announced to the world the Warsaw Treaty and NATO were not adversaries any longer⁷². The former concluded the "Harmel period" in the NATO history. However, the end of this era was neither logical step nor smooth transition in policies. It resulted from fast disintegration of the communist system.

Finally, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe was signed on November 21 by all the CSCE members.⁷³

In the meanwhile the geostrategic situation was changed dramatically by the unification of Germany. Though Mikhail Gorbachev had initially refused to accept unified Germany as a member of NATO, the course of events gave him a little choice. De facto reunification occurred on July 1, 1990, when both German states were tied together by the economic and monetary union. The Four-plus-Two Agreement on behalf of Germany as a whole – regulating rights and restraints for a unified Germany - was signed on September 12, 1990.⁷⁴ On October 3, 1990 the formal reunification took place and the territory of the deceased German Democratic Republic became a part of NATO.

On February 15, 1991 the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary and Poland have created the Visegrad Group⁷⁵. On May 21, 1991 the U.S. House called for reductions of U.S. troops in Europe by 150,000 to 100,000 by 1995. In July, the Warsaw Treaty succumbed to internal pressures and was dissolved. In October the North Atlantic Assembly urged NATO to recall Article 10 of Washington Treaty. On November 8 the NATO Rome Summit proposed the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and adopted a New Strategic Concept whose Article 15 has stated the essential purpose of the Alliance, "to safeguard the

⁷¹ CFE has limited the deployment of military equipment between NATO and the former Warsaw Treaty by restricting numbers of weaponry with very strict verification procedures.

⁷² Solomon, 9.

⁷³ More details in Chapter IV.

⁷⁴ Jeffrey Simon, *NATO Enlargement & Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1996), 10.

⁷⁵ The main objective of the group has been full integration into European structures.

freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter," remains unchanged.

Article 20 of the Concept has formulated the fundamental security tasks of the Alliance:

- To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.
- To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
- To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
- To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

On December 8 the republics of Russia, Belorussia, and Ukraine set up the Commonwealth of Independent States.

On December 20 the first meeting of the NACC was held in Brussels. Membership in the new institution was limited to the NATO and former Warsaw Treaty countries. Some other countries, for instance Austria and Finland, were given a status of observers. According to Secretary Baker, the NACC was intended to be the area for consultation between the NATO and non-NATO states on security and related issues.⁷⁶ In Washington, the NACC was considered as the first step to NATO membership for the participating non-NATO countries⁷⁷.

On December 21 the Soviet Union imploded. Boris Yeltsin, Russian President, sent NATO the message in which he opened a question of Russian membership in NATO.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Solomon, 14.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 19.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 13.

On June 4, 1992 NATO agreed to consider the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) request for peacekeeping support. Consequently, on September 2, NATO agreed to provide resources to support the United Nations, CSCE, and the European Community efforts in former Yugoslavia.

On December 18 the NACC adopted the 1993 NACC Work Plan, where it agreed to "consultations...leading to cooperation" in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping activities as joint planning, training and peacekeeping exercises were to serve as a vehicle:

To help develop democratically controlled armed forces, enhance mutual understanding of security policies create the conditions for wider participation in crisis management in the European area, and built the same habits of cooperation that were the trademark of the alliance.⁷⁹

Actually, even before that decision some NACC members had cooperated with NATO members in the UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia. Poland and the Czech Republic proved that they were able to work with the militaries of the NATO countries. Later, the successful participation in peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia became a very strong argument for the supporters working toward NATO enlargement.

At that time, several ways of NATO enlargement were considered. None of them suggested immediate and direct membership of any Eastern Europe country. Jeffrey Simon suggested an associate NATO membership leading in "five-to-ten years" to full membership; the "Royal Road" suggested that the EU membership should precede or coincide with membership in NATO; Jamie Shea, NATO spokesperson, proposed a two-part protocol of accession to NATO for Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.⁸⁰

Russia was strongly opposed to the enlargement and considered it to be a threat to its security. President Yeltsin was immediately criticized by almost all political groups in Russia when he did not object to Polish membership in NATO and considered enlargement as a perspective issue during the private talks

⁷⁹ Ibid., 17.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 19-23.

with the Polish president in Warsaw in 1993.⁸¹ In February 1999 Mikhail Gorbachev declared that he was betrayed by the West, because he had been given non-written promise during 1990 negotiations that NATO would not be enlarged. Former Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Shevardnadze, denied that the promise had been made by the West representatives; however, Kay has written:

When proposing "2-plus-4" negotiations on German unification to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in February 1990, US Secretary of State James Baker asked, 'Would you prefer to see united Germany outside of NATO and with no U.S. forces, perhaps with its own nuclear weapons? ... Or would you prefer a unified Germany to be tied to NATO, with assurances that NATO's jurisdiction would not shift one inch eastward from its present position?'⁸²

1. Partnership for Peace

In 1993 there was no clear NATO enlargement strategy. Instead of making a decision on this issue, a new institution, Partnership for Peace (PfP), was created⁸³. In October 1993 PfP was approved by the White House⁸⁴. The program was firstly proposed to NATO by U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at the defense ministers' informal meeting on October 20-21, 1993 in Travemunde. It was approved at the NATO's January 1994 Brussels summit meeting.⁸⁵

⁸¹ The critics maintained that enlargement would: isolate Russia from the West, create a buffer zone between Russia and Western Europe, deprive Russia of markets for military equipment in the CEE countries, create new military threats to Russia and cause Russia to lose its importance to the West. (Solomon, 23.)

⁸² Kay, 56-7.

⁸³ In an article "No hope on NATO," Marc Ballon has cited General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shalikashvili said that enlarging NATO at that moment would isolate Russia, and that instead of that the United States favored PfP. Shalikashvili denied that Russian pressure had had any effect on America's decision. Shalikashvili also said that PfP was the first step to integration to NATO and that the pace of integration would depend on the candidates. According to Ballon, the speech apparently reflected Clinton's position. (Prague: *Prague Post*, January 5, 1994)

⁸⁴ Solomon, 152.

⁸⁵ Yost., 97.

Article 2 of the PfP Framework Document has obligated the non-NATO states that signed this document to cooperate with the NATO in the following areas: ⁸⁶

- facilitation of transparency in national defense planning;
- ensuring democratic control of defense forces;
- capability and readiness, subject to constitutional considerations, to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
- cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian and other operations;
- Development of the forces that are better able to operate with NATO forces.

The NAC declaration from January 1994 has committed NATO to "consult, with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security." ⁸⁷ PfP has been perceived as a means for calming down both East European states demanding NATO membership and Russia, which has opposed the enlargement, and was still a main objective of the U.S. foreign policy at that time. ⁸⁸ PfP has provided partners with multiple functions and has quickly become a pan-European security institution, reaching far beyond OSCE ⁸⁹ achievements ⁹⁰.

2. Combined Joint Task Forces Concept

The January 1994 Brussels Summit adopted the principles of the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). The objective of the concept was to update the NATO military structure in order to deal more effectively with the non-Article 5 missions and facilitate building the ESDI within NATO. It took

⁸⁶ Ibid., 310.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 97-98.

⁸⁸ This direction has been shortly expressed as "Russia first."

⁸⁹ CSCE was renamed OSCE on January 1, 1994.

⁹⁰ Yost, 98.

another two years of negotiating to codify CJTF by the Berlin 1996 ministerial meeting. The project was delayed by disputes within the Alliance, particularly between the United States and France, but also Turkey and Greece.

CJTF and the new NATO command structure are intended to have multiple function. They should serve both Article 5 and non-Article 5 missions. Specific CJTF operations could be carried out under the WEU command with participation of the PfP nations and countries from beyond the Euro-Atlantic region and they could draw on NATO assets.⁹¹

3. How, Why, When, Who

Shortly before NATO approval of PfP, on October 11, 1993, the North Atlantic Assembly in Copenhagen urged a timetable and criteria for NATO enlargement.⁹²

During 1993 and 1994, the enlargement became a serious topic in the United States, in both political and military circles. NATO has just adapted to PfP, which was considered to be convenient means for getting time to thoroughly deliberate enlargement options, when signals came from the United States that the Clinton administration had shifted the policy.

The January 1994 Brussels Summit did not bring any significant decision on the enlargement issue. It only reaffirmed that according Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance would welcome new members; however, instantaneously, President Clinton noted that there was no question "if" to take on new members any longer, the question was "when."

During the December 1994 meeting it was decided to find out in an internal NATO examination how to enlarge NATO on which principles, and what would be the implications of membership. The

⁹¹ Ibid., 204.

⁹² Solomon, 152.

resulting 1995 *Study on NATO Enlargement* answered “how” and “why” questions, and gave rationale for enlargement.⁹³

On November 8, 1996 the United States proposed that the NACC and PfP be merged in an Atlantic Partnership Council. In May 1997, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a successor to NACC, was established. The “enhanced” PfP has worked in its framework.

The December 1996 NAC offered Russia a charter and declared no intent to deploy nuclear weapons on the new members’ territory. It also announced that new members could be invited at the 1997 Summit.

On May 27, 1997 NATO and Russia signed “NATO-Russia Founding Act” in Paris. The document outlined their future security relationship. On May 29, 1997 the NATO-Ukraine Charter was initiated in Sintra, Portugal.

On June 12, 1997 President Clinton announced:

After careful consideration, I’ve decided that United States will support inviting three countries - Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic - to begin accession talks to join NATO when we meet in Madrid next month.⁹⁴

The July 1997 Rome NATO meeting solved the rest of the enlargement puzzle. On July 8 it gave definitive answers to questions “who” and “when.” Three countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited to begin talks on entering NATO, with the prospect of launching an access process in December 1997, and becoming members at around the NATO 50th Anniversary in April 1999.⁹⁵

Several countries led by France had also wanted to invite Romania and Slovenia in order to bring stability to the Balkans, but the proposal was rejected by President Clinton who was supported by British Prime Minister Blair.

⁹³ The study has stated purposes and principles of enlargement. It has not given any fixed list of criteria for inviting new members to join NATO.

⁹⁴ Solomon, 136.

⁹⁵ Yost., 102-104.

On December 16, 1997 the foreign ministers of NATO countries signed three protocols to the Washington Treaty.⁹⁶

4. Debate on Enlargement

NATO has been enlarged four times since its inception. In 1952 Turkey and Greece joined the Alliance. In that case, the reason for doing so was a strategic one: the enlargement was a part of the policy of containment. In 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO because of strategic considerations that required its rearmament and forward defense. In 1982 Spain's accession to the Organization was the tool for reinforcing democratization processes in the country. In all the cases, NATO was reinforcing its position in the Cold War. The fourth enlargement is of another kind. This time, NATO would be enlarged at the time when a main threat to the Alliance, the Soviet Union, has collapsed, its successor Russia is a declining power, and the Cold War is over. Gallis has written:

The debate over expansion/enlargement is taking place at a moment when NATO's mission is unclear. Clarification of the alliance's purpose most likely hinges upon the ability of the United States and its allies to come to the agreement over their mutual security interests, and how best to protect them. The debate over enlargement has addressed key issues surrounding those interests.⁹⁷

a. Debate in the United States

There was no consensus on the U.S. post-Cold War security strategy in the United States. Not all politicians in the United States supported the Clinton administration's call to remain actively engaged in global affairs and promote the spread of democracy abroad.⁹⁸

Yost has written:

⁹⁶ Gallis has characterized the Protocols as brief general documents extending invitations to the candidate states to join NATO. They are legal instruments on which current member parliaments voted in deciding to admit the candidate states. (Gallis, 3.)

⁹⁷ Paul E. Gallis, *NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance* (Congressional Research Service, 1999), 1.

⁹⁸ Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Van Tassel, *What is American Defense Policy?* in Peter L. Hays, Brenda J. Vallance, and Alan R. Van Tassel eds., *American Defense Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 10-11.

NATO enlargement was not a prominent issue in the years immediately following the collapse of communism in East-Central Europe in late 1989. In April 1991, Paul Wolfowitz, then U.S. under secretary of defense for policy, ... implied in his speech that the East Europeans should not expect membership in NATO or explicit security guarantees.⁹⁹

In November 1991 President Bush stated that it was premature to go beyond the NACC, and the frame of consultations between NATO and East Europe. NATO enlargement was never actively considered by the Bush administration.¹⁰⁰

The change has been brought by Clinton's administration. Its interest in NATO enlargement could have been caused by strong supporters of enlargement from both sides of the ocean.¹⁰¹ In Europe, for instance, enlargement was supported by presidents Vaclav Havel and Lech Walesa, and Germany's Defense Minister Volker Rühe. In the United States, groups of Americans tied to Europe, former high level officials, members of Congress from both parties who endorsed the Lugar argument¹⁰², and prominent experts supported the enlargement.

Garfinkle has stated that the turn in U.S. policy towards NATO enlargement was caused by the disappointing development in Russia, which raised worries in East European countries. Their demands for NATO membership and U.S. policy towards Russia led to PfP, "a halfway-house of both commitment and understanding." The U.S. unsuccessful policy in Bosnia followed in its wake. Administration's sudden change in its approach to enlargement could be explained as an effort to repair the damage done by mistakes in Bosnia. The turn was made in spite of U.S. policy of pragmatic partnership with Russia.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Yost, 100.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, 101.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 101.

¹⁰² Lugar stated that NATO would have to go "out of area or out of business." (Yost, 101.)

¹⁰³ Adam Garfinkle, NATO Enlargement: What's the Rush? (*The National Interest Quarterly-Winter 1996/97*), 109.

On April 30, 1998 the U.S. Senate voted 80–19 in favor of the ratification of the NATO enlargement. In other words, the Senate gave its consent to the amendment of the North Atlantic Treaty to admit the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. The resolution had bipartisan support of 45 Republicans and 35 Democrats, and was opposed by 9 Republicans and 10 Democrats.

President Clinton signed the Resolution of Ratification on May 22, 1998.

The resolution was the result of a several years long debate. Its central factor was the question of what measures should be taken to avoid instability in Central Europe, and how to do it without threatening or isolating Russia. Neither proponents nor opponents of NATO enlargement have wished to create adverse relationships between the West and Russia.¹⁰⁴ The other important issue was burden sharing.

b. Opponents' Arguments

The supporters of the enlargement had to face three groups of opponents: isolationists, defense hawks, and liberal internationalists.¹⁰⁵

Defense hawks argued that NATO's enlargement would have a potential negative impact on its military posture. They expressed their worries about future deployment of U.S. forces in Europe, and argued that American public would demand return of U.S. troops home. They further argued that in this case the North Atlantic Treaty would be a deterrent to aggression as the UN Charter.¹⁰⁶ Also, defense hawks were afraid of the size of NATO, because there was no limit to the future enlargements. Senator John Warner (R-Virginia) proposed two amendments to the Resolution on Ratification. One was to postpone the next enlargement for three years to buy time for assessment of enlargement's effects on NATO, and another

¹⁰⁴ Paul E Gallis, *NATO: Congress Addresses Expansion of the Alliance*. (Congressional Research Service, 1999), 1.

¹⁰⁵ Garfinkle has divided participants in discussion into two categories: realists and idealists. He has argued that the debates were unsatisfying and curious. Unsatisfying because there was no real discussion; just "contrary assertions passing each other without making useful contact." They were curious because of changing participants' positions from supporting to opposing one and vice versa. Details see Garfinkle, 102-111.

¹⁰⁶ Yost, 105.

one to require potential candidates for NATO to enter the European Union first. Both amendments were defeated.

The liberal internationalists' standpoint was that the enlargement regarding Russia was going to be done too early, and that this decision would have negative impact on U.S.-Russian relationships. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) and George Kennan supported this opinion.¹⁰⁷

The isolationists' point of view was that NATO had fulfilled its historical role to defeat the Soviet Union and that there was no reason for its existence. The toned down isolationist opinion was that NATO would play role of regional peacekeeper.¹⁰⁸

In April 1998, Gallis has summarized the con arguments used in enlargement debate as follows:¹⁰⁹

- There is no threat to any current ally or candidate state, and no need therefore to expand NATO's collective defense commitments. Enlargement will create new dividing lines in Europe by putting Russia on guard against an alliance moving into its traditional areas of influence. Not inviting such countries as the Baltic States and Romania to join the alliance signals Moscow that they are isolated and subject to its influence.
- The key U.S. interest in Europe is ensuring Russia's continued democratization and integration into the community of nations. Enlargement will humiliate Moscow and create a "Weimar Russia," vulnerable to Russian nationalists hostile to the west who believe that the country's interests are being sacrificed by weak leadership.
- Russia is important to the success of NATO's "new missions." Enlargement will jeopardize the cooperation of Moscow that is necessary to forge successful coalitions for peace operations and crisis management.
- Russia is the only country that can destroy the United States. Russian nationalists view enlargement as a threat, and are certain to oppose the START II nuclear treaty and other arms control agreements, which are desirable for protecting U.S. interests.
- In the post-Cold-War era, securing European stability should be left to political institutions, such as the European Union (EU), and not too military institutions, such as NATO. Central Europe's true needs are strong economic structures and democratic institutions, which are in the EU's realm and not NATO's.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 106-107.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 107-108.

¹⁰⁹ Paul E. Gallis. *NATO Enlargement: Pro and Con Arguments*. (CRS Report for Congress. April 14, 1998)

- Partnership for Peace (PfP) is preferable to NATO enlargement because it is already accomplishing the tasks of ensuring civilian control of the military, transparent defense budgets, and training for NATO's "new missions."
- NATO enlargement will be expensive, and the allies show no willingness to share the costs. The administration once estimated the costs to be \$27-35 billion over 12 years, but other estimate range as high as \$60-125 billion.
- Enlargement will dilute the alliance's effectiveness by complicating decision-making, and by admitting countries unable to contribute meaningfully to the alliance's core mission of collective defense.
- Bosnia demonstrates that the Europeans are not willing to bear the burden for ensuring security of their own backyard. If instability develops in central Europe, the United States will have to shoulder the financial and military costs of bringing peace.

c. Supporters' Arguments

On April 23, 1997 during the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Secretary of State Albright stated that a wider NATO would:

- prevent future conflict in Europe, because alliances reduce the likelihood of threat or force being used against them;
- defend democracy and integration; and
- strengthen NATO.¹¹⁰

On May 31, President Clinton stated that enlargement would:

- improve the alliance's ability to meet security challenges, as in Bosnia;
- secure democracy;
- encourage prospective members to resolve problems peacefully; and
- erase the artificial line in Europe drawn by Stalin and bring security.¹¹¹

Supporters of enlargement in the Congress were using, besides the Administration's reasons, the argument of risks of Russian nationalism; however, the retired U.S. Army General William

¹¹⁰ Solomon, 123.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 135.

Odom, a former director of the National Security Agency, refused this argument stating that Russia would be too engaged in Central Asia and Transcaucasus to pose a threat to Central Europe.¹¹² The Administration used also balance-of-power-reasons¹¹³.

In April 1998 Gallis has summarized the pro arguments used in enlargement debate as follow: ¹¹⁴

- Europe is the home of many the world's most important democracies and market economies; enlargement will promote stability in Europe by providing a secure environment for new members to further consolidate democracy and open markets. Enlargement will gradually end Cold-War divisions in Europe and bring new members into integrated Euro-Atlantic community.
- The NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 provides Moscow with "a voice but not a veto," and ensures that Russia will enjoy consultation on the key European security issues outside NATO territory.
- An alternative view is that Russia remains a potential threat, and that enlargement will secure for the alliance a significant presence in a strategically important area, thereby limiting Moscow's potential sphere of influence.
- The cost of enlargement to the alliance will be modest (\$1.3-1.5 billion over 10 years according to a NATO study) because there is a little threat. In contrast, the NATO operation in Bosnia, for example, has thus far cost the United States alone over \$7 billion in the effort to secure stability. Failure to expand the alliance would leave central European states anxious over potential border and minority issues with neighboring countries.
- Enlargement will sustain U.S. leadership in Europe. While expansion of the European Union is important for encouraging stability, NATO enlargement will further secure the transatlantic link that many European states wish to preserve and extend into the 21st century.
- Collective defense remains the core of the alliance. Extending it to qualified new members will deter aggression in a traditionally unstable region.
- Enlargement will prevent the "renationalization" of defense in central Europe. Each new member need develop only that part of its military that serves overall alliance purposes, and will benefit from a NATO military infrastructure linking it to countries committed to collective defense.

¹¹² Yost, 108-109.

¹¹³ Holbrooke used balance-of-power reason explicitly to German-Russian rivalries. Albright spoke in more general terms of confidence problem in Central Europe. In her opinion, NATO's failure to enlarge could bring about search for security by other means, including armament race and competition among neighbors. (Yost, 109)

¹¹⁴ Gallis, 1998.

- U.S. and western defense industries will benefit by securing markets for their armaments in the newly allied states.

d. American Public

The public was not interested in the debate. The administration's task was to sell the public largely indifferent to international involvement a policy committing the United States to defend the three Eastern European countries.¹¹⁵ The 4 -11 September 1997 poll proved that the public had a little knowledge of NATO enlargement and that only 10 percent could name at least one new potential member of NATO. The proposal was supported by 63 percent and opposed by 18 percent of respondents¹¹⁶.

e. Debate in Congress

The debate on NATO enlargement in Congress started in 1993. A year before the main NATO topic in Congress had been that of burden sharing, which resulted in the Frank Amendment to the fiscal 1993 House defense authorization bill. It cut Pentagon's overseas operations expenditures by \$3.5 billion. When arguing for his proposal, Congressman Frank asked, whether America's victory in the Cold War had any fiscal dividends and whether she has the right to enjoy a little savings after 45 years in defense of freedom. Budget Committee Chairman Leon E. Panetta, D-California supported the Frank Amendment with argument that the United States would not bankroll the world any longer.¹¹⁷

The cost of enlargement question was often raised during the Senate and House debates. While the administration's assessment publicized on February 24, 1997 was relatively low - annually about \$200 million between 1999 and 2009 - the March 1996 study by Congressional Budget Office estimated the annual cost the United States should pay at \$320 million annually in the same period. The difference provoked suspicion that the administration assessment was purposely low. The issue was even more

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 1637.

¹¹⁶ Pat Towell, Allbright Argues NATO Expansion Would Buttress Democracy (*CQ Weekly*, October 11, 1997), 2496.

¹¹⁷ Pentagon Gets Most of Its Wish List. (1992 *CQ Almanac*), 486-8.

sensitive after the French President Chirac announced on July 9, 1997 that France would not increase its annual contribution to meet the cost of enlargement.¹¹⁸

5. NATO Participation Act

On January 27, 1994 the Senate passed a "sense of the Senate" resolution¹¹⁹ calling upon the Administration to urge NATO enlargement.¹²⁰ On July 14, 1994 the Senate adopted an amendment urging NATO to invite the Visegrad countries according to their readiness to contribute to the security in the area. On July 15 the Senate adopted a bill entitled "NATO Participation Act," that authorized the president to transfer excess defense articles to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland and suggested to help them with increasing standardization and interoperability.¹²¹ On October 8 the Senate gave final passage to "NATO Participation Act"¹²² that became law on November 4, 1994. Solomon has stated:

The act first specified, as the sense of the Congress, that active PfP partners 'should be invited to become full NATO members in accordance with Article 10 of Treaty at an early date' if they 'maintain progress toward establishing democratic institutions, free market economies, civilian control of the armed forces, and the rule of law' and 'remain committed to protecting the rights of all their citizens and respecting the territorial integrity of their neighbors.'¹²³

These criteria for membership were later referred to in the European Security Act of 1998.

In the 1996 budget \$85 million was included for help to former Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO.

¹¹⁸ Carroll J. Doherty, Clinton Gets Foreign Policy Win As NATO Agrees to Expansion (*CQ Weekly*, July 12, 1997), 1638

¹¹⁹ It is non-binding document.

¹²⁰ Literally, the resolution called upon the Government to "urge prompt admission to NATO for those nations after they have demonstrated such capability and willingness ... to support collective defense requirements and established democratic practices." (Solomon, 49)

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 50.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 66.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 67.

6. NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act

In July 1996 the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act passed in both Chambers.

Solomon has characterized its main provision as follows:

- “The United States continues to regard the political independence and territorial integrity of all emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe as vital to European peace and security”;
- The Congress finds that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have made the most progress toward achieving the NATO eligibility criteria (the Senate added Slovenia);
- An amount of \$60 million was authorized to facilitate the transition to NATO membership, with the four countries designated as eligible to receive assistance;
- The process of enlarging NATO should not stop with the admission of these countries, and the president may designate other countries as eligible, including Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine, whereas the countries of the Caucasus region should not be precluded from future NATO membership.¹²⁴

The Administration supported the legislation after the sponsors gave the president greater flexibility in deciding how and how quickly to pursue the expansion of the alliance. Despite the name the bill merely stated that the three countries had made the most progress toward meeting the criteria for admission and deserved U.S. aid for that objective.¹²⁵ The president signed the act on September 30, 1996 and on October 22, 1996 announced that by 1999 the first group of invited countries should become members of NATO¹²⁶.

7. European Security Act

In June 1997 the House passed the European Security Act of 1997. The document endorsed NATO enlargement and urged that NATO should not close the door if the enlargement occurs.¹²⁷ Later it became

¹²⁴ Solomon, 100.

¹²⁵ 1996 CQ Almanac, 8-15, 16.

¹²⁶ Solomon, 100.

¹²⁷ Gallis has summarized that the act also states that no commitments be made to Russia over deployments of forces in new member states that would put such states in a category different from that of current members. (Gallis, 1999, Summary)

the European Security Act 1998 and was signed by the president on October 21, 1998.

8. Senate Hearings

The first 1997 hearing on the enlargement was held by the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 23, 1997. Witnesses, the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright and the Secretary of Defense, William Cohen gave their testimonies on the administration's support for enlarging the membership of NATO.¹²⁸

Albright stressed in her speech that at that time, the candidates were not chosen yet and NATO's discussion with Russia and other nations was not complete. Nevertheless, the directions and outlines of U.S. policy were clear. Albright said about fundamental goal of the U.S. policy,

It is to build for the first time a peaceful, free, and undivided transatlantic community. It is to extend eastward to Central Europe and the former Soviet Union the peace and prosperity that Western Europe has enjoyed for the last 50 years. In this way, America will gain strong new partners in security and trade and we will gain confidence that our armed forces will not again be called upon to fight on European soil.... We have important interests in Central Europe. If there were a major threat to peace and security of this region, it is already likely that we would choose to act. The point of enlargement is to deter such a threat from ever arising.¹²⁹

Senators' questions ranged from security framework in Europe to the enlargement costs.¹³⁰

Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations were held between October 21-23, 1997. The main topic was cost of enlargement, but the questions covered the whole spectrum of the enlargement problems.

Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were held on October 7, 9, 22, 28, 30 and November 30, 1997. Key issues were the cost of the enlargement and possible Russian reaction. In her opening speech, Albright enlightened why NATO would remain a collective defense organization, and gave

¹²⁸ *United States Senate One Hundred Fifth Congress, First Session* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 2.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 5-6.

¹³⁰ Details in *Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services*, 1997.

the reasons for U.S. focusing on the security issues. The reasons were threats to the Europe's past, present, and future. In the past, European nations perceived their neighbors as enemies. The NATO era and territory, where the nations cooperated, were the only exceptions. In Europe's present, the Balkan conflict and the conflicts in the former Soviet Union served as illustrations of the security threats. As far as the future was concerned, some dangers were visible, others far off, but not unthinkable. Russia was mentioned as a possible future threat. Also, Albright said, "We do not know what other dangers may arise 10, 20, or even 50 years from now... We know that whatever the future may hold, it will be in our interest to have a vigorous and larger alliance with those European democracies that share our values and our determination to defend them."¹³¹

9. Resolution of Ratification

The foreign ministers of the three countries spent February 9-10 in Washington, lobbying for the resolution. They assured Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Ted Stevens, R – Alaska, an influential enlargement skeptic, that "their countries neither had asked for nor had been promised that U.S. troops would be deployed on their territory or that the U.S. government would pay to modernize their armed forces, if they joined the alliance".¹³² During the visit the president sent to the Senate a protocol to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty that would add the three countries to NATO.¹³³ On April 30, 1998 the Senate approved the three nations for membership in NATO. The vote showed the interest of the Senate in NATO burden sharing by adopting two amendments by Stevens. The first one required congressional authorization of any U.S. spending related to NATO enlargement. The second one urged the president to propose a gradual reduction of the U.S. share in NATO's budget.¹³⁴

¹³¹ Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate. One Hundred Fifth Congress. First Session. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 13.

¹³² Pat Towell. Three Nations' Top Diplomats Lobby for NATO Membership. (*CQ Weekly*, February 14, 1998), 400.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 399.

¹³⁴ Pat Towell, "Senate Approves Three Nations For Membership in NATO." (*CQ Weekly*, May 2, 1998), 1164 – 6.

Although the enlargement has had a strong bipartisan support in Congress since 1994 and the Resolution of Ratification was approved by far higher majority than the Constitution requests, future applicants' path to NATO might not be so easy. The Senate tabled an amendment by John Warren that would not have allowed membership invitations to additional countries for three years by a vote of 41-59. This amendment had strong supporters, including Jesse Helms, R-N.C., and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Jack Reed, D-R. I., who supported the resolution, said that he would be very wary of the quick integration of other countries into NATO, because it could "compound all the problems." Joseph R. Biden Jr., D-Del., another proponent of the resolution, stated that the lawmakers wanted to wait for evidence that the three countries can be integrated without the adverse effects critics had predicted.¹³⁵

b. Debate in Germany

Germany was the strongest supporter of enlargement in NATO Europe; however, there were certain disputes among the policymakers. Because of Russia, Chancellor Kohl wanted to postpone any specification of candidates and schedule as long as possible. On the other hand, Germany Defense Minister Volker Rühe stated as early as on May 21, 1993 that admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia into the European Union and NATO was a question of "how" and "when," not "if."¹³⁶ Rühe also pursued the idea of moving the Western stability area as far east as possible, and called for a special partnership NATO/Russia.¹³⁷ The arguments debated in the national forum generally paralleled those in the United States. The proponents argued that enlargement would increase stability and promote democracy in Europe and provide "a framework for the long-term consolidation of democratization and free market economic reform." The opponents used the Russia argument, arguing that enlargement would paralyze the

¹³⁵ Towell, 1164.

¹³⁶ Solomon, 30.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 31.

decision process in NATO and draw new dividing lines in Europe. The Bundestag approved the enlargement bill in March 1998 by a huge majority.¹³⁸

By December 1998 all the NATO countries approved the enlargement and one part of the NATO history was over. The next chapter examines NATO from another point of view. It is focused on the possible NATO's role in the framework of interlocking institutions.

¹³⁸ Yost, 110.

IV. NATO COOPERATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERLOCKING ORGANIZATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War, new questions about European security have emerged. During the Cold War, the European security was achieved through division of the continent and dominance by the two powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The present situation is different.

After the Cold War, there have been no peace negotiations. The Cold War had no official victor. There were no losers that should have been excluded from the post-Cold War institutional arrangements. Moreover, all the Western security institutions established during the Cold War have survived. They still exist and play their roles despite the fact they were designed for completely different international system and security environment. It has resulted in the fact that the end of the Cold War brought a long debate about the future of instead of profound changes in the institutional framework of Europe.

B. THEORY OF POST-COLD WAR STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK

There are three basic views about the structural framework of post-Cold War Europe. These are as follow:

- A state-centric structure
- A pan-European structure
- A multiple institutional structure¹³⁹

The state-centric structure is based on the independent states. The theory predicts the exit of both superpowers. Europe then is not able to maintain gains of the Cold War in terms of cooperation and institution building, and will return to behavioral patterns given by a multipolar structure. National rivalries will re-emerge with Germany as the most powerful European State. The European security order from this perspective is one based on independent states with very limited role played by the international institutions.

¹³⁹ Trine Flockhart, *From Vision to Reality: Implementing Europe's New Security Order* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 1-4.

The pan-European structure is based on collective security. The main argument of this theory is that there is no particular identifiable enemy any longer. Consequently, the need for the Cold War alliances has vanished. The view of Europe is that of the continent:

With shared history and with a shared commitment to common values and principles such as democracy, human rights and rule of law. The assumption therefore is that the members of the pan-European system will wish to maintain the status quo, with the exception of small scale boarder skirmishes and *minor* ethnic conflicts, where the rest of the members of the pan-European system will be able to step in against the aggressor in their midst.¹⁴⁰

The theory emphasizes Europe's common destiny given by the growing multifaceted interdependence, geographic proximity and new concerns such as environmental issues, large-scale migration and crime. Therefore, collective security is closely connected to common security.

The security architecture coming out of this view is based on the strengthened OSCE and on possible help from the strengthened UN.

The multiple institutional structure recognizes the main elements of both the previous theories, the danger of a return to a multipolar balance of power system and the view that Europe has a shared destiny. This theory gives a new importance to the international institutions in their two objectives of preventing the return to state-centric structure (particularly by binding German foreign policy to European Union foreign policy) and extending the West European achievements to the rest of Europe.

This school rejects the pan-Europeans' arguments that collective defense organizations have lost reasons for their existence with the disappearance of the clear enemy (the Soviet Union) and that collective security would play the decisive role. Proponents of this theory argue that NATO and the WEU did not play only the collective defense role during the Cold War, but they also served as means in the "West European learning process towards new cooperative norms, values and procedures in West European relationships."¹⁴¹ The aim is to repeat the same process in the rest of Europe. The negative approach to

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 4-5.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 5.

more significant role of the collective security institutions is upheld by the gloomy historical record of collective security.

The security architecture based on this theory is one that is "based on a multitude of different institutions performing a multitude of different roles in a system commonly known as interlocking institutions."¹⁴²

C. CONCEPT OF SECURITY

The end of the Cold War has changed the understanding of the concept of security. Instead of the narrow view of security in terms of politico-military relations between states, the world has accepted a wider interpretation of the term. This new perceiving of security has extended its meaning into five dimensions; besides the traditional military dimension, there are a political, economic, societal, and an environmental ones. Flockhart has used Buzan's definition:

Military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states' perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.¹⁴³

The broad concept of security was accepted also by NATO in the 1991 Rome Declaration that stated that the Alliance would serve a broad concept of security.

The broad concept has been accepted by all relevant security organizations and "implemented outcome of the vision for security in Europe must include security in all dimensions."¹⁴⁴

¹⁴² Ibid., 5.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 8.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 8.

D. THE POST-COLD WAR DEBATE ABOUT EUROPE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The 1990-91 period debate was marked by the feeling of optimism and with the calling for dissolving standing Western European security institutions and creating a pan-European collective security organization. In the beginning of 1992 certain a consensus on a new European order began to take shape. It was influenced by the developments in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, disputes between western democracies about the favored security organization, and better recognition of the East European countries' tremendous tasks of transition to democracy and market economies. The system of interlocking and overlapping institutions or more positively system of mutually reinforcing institutions has been chosen to become the basis of European security.

The system is perhaps more the output of realities and needs for consensus than the result of proactive policy making. Therefore, there is no single guide for next steps needed to build up the system. Nevertheless, several characteristics of the system have been identified. Flockhart has written:

- The system is based on the principle that as post-Cold War European security is of a such multifaceted character, all 'hands on deck' are needed to deal with a multitude of situations ranging from ethnic conflict, large-scale migration, environmental disasters and a variety of military security threats, to the prevention of the situations that could trigger the above events off. Situations that are envisaged as potential catalysts for triggering of large-scale migration etc. are for example economic and political collapse as witnessed in Albania, environmental disasters and growing ethnic or interstate crises. Hence the system of mutually reinforcing institutions is supposed to play a preventive role as well as being able to deal with situations as they emerge.
- The system is based on a multitude of different security organizations, where the core organizations can be said to be the European Union (EU), NATO, WEU, and the OSCE. Furthermore the Council of Europe and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) play the significant role such as do the various regional organizations such as the Visegrad Group, the Nordic Council or the Baltic Sea Council. The organizations are arranged on four complementary levels.
- The regional level based on a multitude of regional links of cooperation as that between the Visegrad states or the Baltic Sea Council.
- The European level based on the EU, WEU, EBRD and Council of Europe.
- The Atlantic level based on NATO; and

- The pan-European level based on the OSCE.¹⁴⁵

The consensus about the system and that none of old security organizations would disband has reflected different national views on which organization should take lead. This became apparent in the NATO-WEU case. Initially, France favored the WEU as a separated organization tied to the EU, rather than as an European NATO pillar, but later endorsed (in close cooperation with Germany) WEU's merge with the EU as "the European military arm of the EU", separated from but closely tied to NATO. Britain supported the independent WEU closely tied to NATO rather than the EU merged with the WEU. The United States did not like the idea of losing its European positions and its stance was similar to the British one. The northern European states were closer to Britain, while the southern states followed France. The German position was an ambiguous one, because the Germans on one hand supported a further European integration and on the other hand wanted retaining American influence through NATO.¹⁴⁶

The role of the CSCE was also unclear. The organization was favored by the Soviet Union/Russia and was popular in public. However, it had all the drawbacks of a collective security organization. It was unable to find a solution in the Yugoslavia case, when neither the CSCE nor the EU "were able to agree on identity of the aggressor or the objective of collective action."¹⁴⁷ Moreover an overlap between the NACC and the CSCE was in many ways almost complete. Eastern European countries with tight budgets and the lack of diplomatic staff then preferred one organization to the other one according to the concurrent situation.

The wastefulness and organizational rivalry have been recognized in the system, and the institutions have been undergoing the process of adjustment since 1992. Flockhart has written:

The OSCE is discussing its role in 21st century, NATO is moving towards enlargement while developing parallel relations with Russia through the 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russia Federation', and the

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 12

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 13.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 13.

EU is preparing for enlargement to the East whilst at the same time building on the achievements of Maastricht.¹⁴⁸

E. TASKS AHEAD

Though the present state of a new European security order is far from the idealistic vision of a "Common European House," the overall aim of peaceful Europe working as a whole towards levels of stability and prosperity until now reached only in Western Europe has remained. The general objective is commitment to the CSCE principles held up in the Helsinki Final Act. These commitments are frequently referred to in documents and by policymakers, but, as Flockhart has written:

The exact implications of the commitments and action for achieving them have not been formulated at an official level. In fact the actual tasks of the new security order often seem rather vague and ill defined, with the different tasks being emphasized by the different actors, and no overall appreciation of the different tasks and the possibility of their mutual incompatibilities.¹⁴⁹

Flockhart has summarized the tasks of the new European security order on which the achievement of peace, stability and prosperity depends on as follows:

- Safeguarding postwar achievements in terms of integration and changed norms, values and procedures for conducting interstate relations in Western Europe during the Cold War - particularly 'keeping the core intact.'
- Repeating in the long term the West European achievements in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), by ensuring that a speeded up 'learning process' takes place to ensure that integration takes place in CEE and the similar norms, values and procedures are adopted by CEE states.
- That 'damage limiting structures' are in place in the short term for dealing with a whole catalogue of new threats from environmental disaster and economic instability to ethnic and interstate conflict.
- Preventing the 'redrawing on new lines of antagonism' in Europe - particularly that whatever action is taken to achieve tasks 1-3 does not result in new antagonism developing vis-a-vis Russia.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 13.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 14.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 15

The task number one seems to be vital for the achievement of the others not only because they depend on it. The development in CEE in the last ten years has also shown that if integration is hard to control, disintegration is almost impossible to stop once it starts.¹⁵¹

F. INSTITUTIONS AND MILESTONES OF THE NEW ORDER

NATO, the EU, the WEU, and the CSCE/OSCE are the main elements of the system of interlocking institutions. Since the end of the Cold War, both these institutions and relationships among them have undergone the significant development whose final outcome is still unclear.

1. NATO

NATO has started the process of its adaptation to new environment with the "London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance." The real process of changes began with the 1991 Rome New Strategic Concept.

Article 21 of the New Alliance's Strategic Concept also expressed the NATO's attitude to the other European institutions,

Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU, and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity in security and defense will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four-core security function. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the Washington Treaty.

In paragraph 3 of the 1991 Rome Declaration the Allies "outlined a relatively clear picture of the vision for Europe's new security architecture. The Challenges we will face in this new Europe cannot be comprehensively addressed by one institution alone, but only in a framework of interlocking institutions tying together the countries of Europe and North America. Consequently, we are working toward a new European security architecture in which NATO, the CSCE, the European Community, the WEU and the

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 15.

Council of Europe complement each other. Regional frameworks of co-operation will also be important. This interaction will be of the greatest significance in preventing instability and divisions that could result from various causes, such as economic disparities and violent nationalism.¹⁵²

In 1992 NATO agreed to assist peacekeeping missions under auspices of either the CSCE or the UN. In other words, it was the approval of missions outside the NATO area of responsibility.

Today NATO remains clearly a collective defense organization whose members are obliged to assist the other members that are subjects of aggression; however, under changed circumstances this commitment does not prevail in NATO's day-to-day agenda. NATO has moved beyond the collective defense. Its purposes have been broadened in harmony with the tasks of the European security system and include a creation of political/military options for dealing with crises and challenges to the interests of the member states, spreading stability to CEE and encouraging cooperation with Russia and other countries. NATO is not a system of collective security; however, it contributes to collective security and is a key part of the emerging Euro-Atlantic system of cooperative security.¹⁵³

2. The European Union

In December 1991 the Treaty on European Union (TEU)¹⁵⁴ was signed in Maastricht on the basis of the 1957 Treaties of Rome. The TEU is important for European security in its broadest sense. Besides the agreement on a Political Union, there was decision to "proceed towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP),¹⁵⁵ including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which may in time lead to common defense." Also, the concept of interlocking institutions is reinforced by stated linkages between the

¹⁵² Ibid., 38.

¹⁵³ Stanley R. Sloan, J. Michelle Forest, *NATO's Evolving Role and Missions* (Congressional Research Service, 1998), 1.

¹⁵⁴ The treaty consists of two treaties - a Treaty on Political Union and a Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union.

¹⁵⁵ CFSP is one of three EU's pillars. The other two are the European Community, and Justice and Home Affairs.

EU and the WEU, where the WEU is responsible for the EU policies with defense implications.¹⁵⁶ In the separate Declaration, the WEU member states acknowledged the WEU would be built "as the defense component of the European Union," and agreed to several measures aimed at improving the EU-WEU cooperation, among them to develop a WEU planning cell to enable closer military co-operation with NATO and military units answerable to the WEU.¹⁵⁷

In order to reach agreement between participants, the TEU was deliberately ambiguous in the defense area. As a result, the French could argue that their argument for the WEU and the more autonomous ESDI was effected there, whereas the British and the United States could state that the Maastricht accepted the primary role of NATO.

3. The WEU

The WEU was formed in 1954; it was based on the revised 1948 Brussels Treaty. It was more or less inactive during the Cold War and was reactivated in 1984 with a view of developing a common European defense identity. The 1987 "Platform on European Security Interests" adopted by Ministerial Council of the WEU in the Hague declared the WEU's "determination both to strengthen the European pillar of NATO and to provide an integrated Europe with a security and defense dimension."¹⁵⁸ The 1991 Maastricht Declaration defined its relations to NATO and the EU. In 1992 the "Petersberg Declaration" formulated the guidelines for the organization's development. WEU member states announced that they were ready to provide for military units to participate in military missions known as "Petersberg Missions" that included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.

¹⁵⁶ Flockhart, 39-40.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 65-6.

¹⁵⁸ *The NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1998), 332.

The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty revised the Maastricht Treaty, particularly by embodying the Petersberg Missions into the Treaty of Amsterdam and providing the European Union with access to an operational capability; however, its ratification has not yet been completed.

Since 1991 the number of members of the WEU has significantly increased. The 1994 Kirchberg Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers created four categories of membership and affiliation.¹⁵⁹ The WEU has no standing forces and command structures of its own. Members and associate members can make the military units and command structures available to the WEU. These include both national units and multinational formations, for instance EUROCORPS, EUROFOR, and EUROMARFOR.¹⁶⁰ WEU headquarters are now in Brussels.

The WEU has been developed as a small scope politico-military organization. During the last several years, its operational capability has been improved and it seems that the organization is capable of conducting the Petersberg tasks of varying sizes.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ These categories are cited in NATO Handbook 1998, p. 336 as follows:

- Members (all WEU members are also members both of NATO and of the EU);
- Associate Members (NATO but not EU members);
- Associate Partners (neither NATO nor EU members);
- Observers (members of NATO and/or EU).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., 331-336.

¹⁶¹ Flockhart, 91.

4. The CSCE/OSCE

Lasting peace in Europe should be based on the integration of all the continents into a series of mutually supporting institutions and relationships that ensure that there will be no return to division or confrontation.... The OSCE (is) the only framework for European security co-operation providing for full and equal participation of all states.

Joint U.S. - Russian Statement on European Security.
Helsinki Summit, 21 March 1997.

The institution has originated from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and since its inception it has played a main role in defining the new European security order.¹⁶² It established ten basic principles guiding states' behavior towards each other and towards their citizens, with stress put on human rights.

On November 21, 1990 CSCE countries signed the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe", a document which declared that the era of confrontation in Europe was over. This document committed the signatories to observe four basic points: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, recognition of parliamentary democracy as the only form of government, rule of law, and commitment to the basic principles of market economy.¹⁶³

At the 1992 Helsinki Summit, the Heads of States declared the CSCE crucial to efforts to forestall aggression and violence by addressing the root causes of problems and to prevent, manage and settle conflicts peacefully by appropriate means. Also, they approved the role of the CSCE in peacekeeping operations with the use of resources of other organizations like NATO and the WEU.

At the 1994 Budapest Summit the CSCE became the OSCE. The change of the name was to symbolize the increasing role of the institution in shaping the new European order in cooperation with other organizations.

The OSCE would serve as a regional arrangement under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter for maintaining international peace and security. As such, it could be authorized by the Security

¹⁶² Ibid., 43.

¹⁶³ Ibid., 37.

Council to undertake enforcement action.¹⁶⁴ The cooperative security system is limited because the OSCE has relied on the consensus (changed by consensus minus one rule, which allows only political steps, in 1992), and cannot enforce peace. It would require the means of other organizations, like NATO or the WEU, or of its members. On the other hand, it is the only Trans-Atlantic institution, which includes all 54 participating states on an equal basis, it has an agreed ability to intervene in internal affairs, and it is quite flexible thanks to its rather political than legal basis¹⁶⁵.

At the 1996 Lisbon Summit, the OSCE started working on the "Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century" that presupposes the widest cooperation and coordination among participating states and European and transatlantic organizations. In December 1997 the OSCE Ministerial in Copenhagen made decision regarding Guidelines on the OSCE Document-Charter on European Security. The Document-Charter is to be based on Platform for Cooperative Security, the aim of which is to strengthen cooperation between mutually reinforcing institutions in a non-hierarchical way.¹⁶⁶ The work on the Model has not been finished yet.

Flockhart has written on OSCE's role:

The exclusive OSCE orientation on co-operative security complements the collective defense and collective security roles of NATO, the WEU, and the UN by seeking to eliminate the root causes of tensions as a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management in the region. Here the OSCE's co-operative role is not exclusive within the new European security order. NATO's PfP and NACC and the latter's successor, EAPC, the WEU dialogue with Associate Partners on their way into the EU, and the Council of Europe all form part of this equation. Nevertheless, the comparative and vital OSCE advantages are inclusiveness of all 54 participating states on an equal, not guest, basis, the agreed ability to intervene in internal affairs, and flexibility in adapting to new requirements owing to its non-bureaucratic political rather than legal foundation. The essential point is that if the OSCE is fully exploited, then the need to resort to armed force for any reason should be rendered unnecessary. In other words, the value of the OSCE in the new European security order lies in its preventative contribution to stability.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 44.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., 46.

¹⁶⁶ *NATO Handbook 1998*, 320-1.

¹⁶⁷ Flockhart, 46.

As Sloan has written, if the European cooperative security system evolves, the OSCE could well serve as the "constitution" and collective security framework of the system.¹⁶⁸

5. European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)

The idea of the ESDI, an attempt to create a collective defense capability of NATO European members, appeared in the EU and the WEU at the end of the Cold War when the European Allies were afraid of an American withdrawal from Europe.¹⁶⁹ Intention to develop the ESDI has appeared in the 1990 London declaration. There were two versions of its development in early 1990s: the first one of the ESDI as "an European pillar" within NATO, supported by Britain and by the United States, and then the version of the ESDI independent of NATO. The strongest supporters of the latter were the French, but they lost their enthusiasm with the Bosnian crisis, where the WEU and the ESDI have lost much of their credibility. Consequently, NATO's meetings in 1996 decided to develop the ESDI within the NATO framework. Before this decision was reached, the 1994 NATO Summit had brought the NATO transformation. The formal recognition of the ESDI was among the significant decisions. The Summit decision on the CJTF concept, which is related to the ESDI, allowed the use of NATO military assets in military actions without involving all of the NATO members, and the participation of non-NATO countries in these actions. This reflected the fact that there could be crisis in Europe whose solution would be possible without engagement of all member states, and mirrored the most important of current NATO missions, the crisis management. Also, this approach tried to contribute to the solution of the burden-sharing problem in NATO.

With the ESDI, the WEU could function as a bridge between the EU and NATO. It is an expression of the ESDI in NATO and of the EU's possible military dimension.

¹⁶⁸ Sloan, 6.

¹⁶⁹ Gordon, 205.

**G. THE NEW NATO - THE FUTURE OF NATO WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF INTERLOCKING SECURITY PROVIDING
INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE**

"My vision of a new and better NATO can be summarized in one sentence: we want an Alliance strengthened by new members; capable of collective defense; committed to meeting a wide range of threats to our shared interests and values; and acting in partnership with others to ensure stability, freedom, and peace in and for the entire Trans-Atlantic area."

Albright Statement to NAC, Brussels, December 8, 1998

The 1997 NATO Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security, recognizing fundamental changes in strategic environment since 1991 when the 1991 Alliance Strategic Concept had been adopted, announced a decision "to examine the Strategic Concept to ensure that it is fully consistent with the Europe's new security situation and challenges."¹⁷⁰ The Declaration reaffirmed the building of the ESDI within NATO and NATO's "commitment to further strengthening the OSCE as a regional organization according to Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations." The Declaration also stated that the OSCE "plays an essential role in securing peace, stability and security in Europe," and that "the principles and commitments adopted by the OSCE provide a foundation for the development of a comprehensive and cooperative European security architecture."¹⁷¹ The 1999 NATO Washington Summit is supposed to adopt an updated Strategic Concept that should become a blueprint for NATO's future.

In December 1998 Secretary of State Albright has characterized the threats NATO would confront as very different from the past ones. She quoted President Clinton who stated in May 1998 that:

Yesterday's NATO guarded our borders against direct military invasion. Tomorrow's NATO must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against threats to security from beyond them - the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence and regional conflict.

¹⁷⁰ Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security, Article 19.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., Article 21.

When talking about the Washington Summit and the New Concept, Albright stressed the importance of understanding of NATO's future role and purposes.¹⁷² "At the Washington Summit," Albright said, "we should issue a concise, non-technical political declaration of our vision for a new and better NATO." NATO must be ready to deal with both Article 5 and non-Article 5 threats, "for if these threats (non-Article 5) are not addressed early and effectively, they could grow into Article 5 threats." Albright also stated, "the new Strategic Concept must find the right balance between affirming the centrality of Article 5.... And ensuring that the fundamental tasks of the Alliance are intimately related to the broader defense of our common interests."¹⁷³ Other points that Albright stressed regarding the New Concept were keeping the NATO door open, addressing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction not only "in a defense context, but also as a political challenge that requires more comprehensive response", and developing the ESDI within NATO. To the last task Albright said:

It is to further intensify and strengthen relations with our (U.S.) European partners. Indeed, in facing future security challenges, the EAPC must also be seen as an instrument of choice. Specifically, the Alliance needs to define, in time for the Washington Summit, a framework for joint crisis response operations.¹⁷⁴

The importance of the tightened cooperation with Russia and Ukraine was stressed.

Senator Roth, NAA Chairman, wrote that the emerging Euro-Atlantic system requires interaction between NATO and other organizations, especially the UN and the OSCE.¹⁷⁵ Referring to the Washington Summit, Roth emphasized that this is an opportunity to reaffirm NATO as "an instrument for collective defense and collective responsibility to help them (NATO members) deal with the new challenges they face." Roth also has written

¹⁷² Ambassador David Wright, Canada's Permanent Representative to the NAC spoke in the same spirit in Toronto on September 14, 1998.

¹⁷³ Albright Statement to the NAC (*Security Issues Digest No.235.*, Brussels: The US Mission to NATO), 8.

¹⁷⁴ Albright Statement, 11

¹⁷⁵ William V. Roth, Jr., *NATO in the 21st Century* (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, 1998), 34.

In revising NATO's Strategic Concept, the Allies should make it absolutely clear that the Euro-Atlantic Community needs the Alliance to help shape the political will and the military capabilities required for the collective defense of common values and interests as well as the defense of territory.... The goal of the NATO members should be to create a system of cooperative security in the Euro-Atlantic area, with the transatlantic Alliance at its center, involving all European nations. The Euro-Atlantic community can be a cornerstone for the construction of peace, justice, and stability in the wider international system.¹⁷⁶

1. The WEU

On December 1, 1998, in his speech to the WEU Assembly on the future of European defense, the British Defense Secretary George Robertson said:

Our aim is quite simple. It is to enable the European union to have a more united and influential voice, articulated with greater speed and coherence through the common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, and backed up when the need arises with effective and prompt military action. The EU must be given the ability both to decide and to act quickly and effectively, in order to achieve common goals.

Robertson also stressed that NATO would remain the collective defense organization and the cornerstone of European security and defense, and that North America's capabilities and commitment to Europe are crucial and must be preserved. Robertson also underlined the significance of political will, the EU's political commitment to crisis management, the importance of adequate European military capabilities, and further suggested an increase in defense spending by the European countries. Robertson also referred to the institutional problems of the EU and the WEU but did not give any decisive proposal. He concluded:

Developing Europe's capabilities will strengthen the Alliance, not undermine it, and respond to aspirations on both sides of the Atlantic. We are keen to enhance the Europeans' capability to act when our North American Allies are not engaged. Equally, however, we should recognize the reality that in many circumstances Europe will turn naturally and rightly to the well-proven body of NATO to carry out military operations. So we should aim to create a new partnership with our North American Allies. The ESDI within the Alliance is one of the most important elements in the Euro-Atlantic security architecture.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., 49.

¹⁷⁷ Speech by The British Defence Secretary, Mr. George Robertson, to the WEU Assembly, Paris, 1 December 1998. Joint statement by the British and French Governments on European defence.

2. The System of Cooperative Security within the OSCE

Wijk has seen the future of NATO in Cooperative Security. His argument has been based on the premise that NATO can be "increasingly conceived in the post-Cold War period as an organization for security cooperation, directed towards the protection of mutual interests." Mutual interests could be interpreted as "internal and external security, namely peaceful and stable relationships both inside and outside the treaty area." In a variety of threats, either crises, wars or use of weapons of mass destruction, number of countries will be differently impacted. This would lead to the different ways and magnitudes of participation by the member states in the operation.

In the absence of a large-scale threat, NATO's mission can no longer be formulated as threat-oriented. The goal should be military cooperation to create the interoperability and capacity necessary for conducting an effective joint military operation. The object of operation can range from defense of the treaty area to humanitarian aid. Thus, NATO has the only mission – conflict prevention and control. Wijk has emphasized that there would be "no distinction made between capabilities and structures for collective defense and those for operations outside the treaty area." The distinction between Article 5 mission and non-Article 5 mission has lost its military relevance, but it is relevant politically and judicially, because it induces the various degrees of "obligation of member states to assist each other."

This new NATO's role in relation to other institutions must be defined in the new political strategy. Consequently, the concept of interlocking institutions must be given further interpretation, which can be achieved by "declaring that NATO's new mission has a role to play in a system of cooperative security." Wijk has described cooperative security system:

The heart of this is mutual economic, socio-cultural and military co-operation between an ever-increasing group of countries. The object of co-operative security is to anticipate potential conflicts and prevent them from breaking out, or to actively strive to suppress conflicts once they have broken out by means of joint international action within the system. Co-operative security does not mean that member states are treaty-bound to offer assistance. If that were the case it would be a question of collective, not co-operative, security. The concept of co-operative security does not assume that all crises can be controlled and that wars can always be avoided. It is intended to give direction to anticipatory actions.

There are several conditions to make the system feasible. First, "a willingness to cooperate closely in all possible areas and common norms and standards of conduct within the system." Second, the countries belonging to the system must be accountable for failing to follow these norms and standards. Third, "a readiness to develop instruments to allow action to be taken to prevent violation of these norms and standards." Fourth, transparency of political intentions of the countries of the system as the basis for cooperation.

The basis of the system is available in the frame of the OSCE. Wijk has described OSCE's achievements in this way:

These include conduct between nations, the development of democracy, the constitutional state, and the social market economy, human rights, minority rights and political-military rules of conduct. Observation of these is closely linked with stability and the prevention of conflicts. Since 1990, the OSCE has also worked on instruments designed to enable action to be taken in situations where there is inadequate implementation or nonimplementation of common norms and standards of conduct. These instruments are largely in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management, the presence of permanent missions, quiet diplomacy by the High Commissioner concerning national minorities, mediation by the OSCE Chairman, the observation of elections, and consultancy mechanisms for conflict prevention and crisis management. Since the second Helsinki conference in 1992, the OSCE can also launch independent peace-enforcement operations.

The OSCE has the norms and standards, but it has no military means. Thus, NATO can "link its new mission of conflict prevention and conflict control to an initiative to give greater substance to the concept of co-operative security within the OSCE." NATO could conduct all military operations within the OSCE area under its command, which could enable NATO to "evolve into an organization, which can carry out a facilitative role for other organizations." This chain of thought has brought Wijk to the argument that "enlargement of NATO with many OSCE countries, including the Russian Federation, would be advantageous."

Wijk has ended with the argument:

It remains crucial that the OSCE is the only European security organization in which Russia participates on an equal footing. Therefore the OSCE also plays an important role in involving Russia in all security questions in Europe, in the restriction of potential Russian expansionist tendencies and in preventing new dividing lines being drawn up in Europe. A new mission for NATO, linked to initiatives to give content the concept of co-

operative security within the OSCE, can thus water down the arguments of those who oppose an enlargement of NATO.¹⁷⁸

H. CONCLUSION

The Cooperative Security System might be established in the Euro-Atlantic Area in the future. Its final shape and relationships between its particular elements have not been detailed yet. All the institutions are developing their blueprints for future. The only document where the wording is stable is the Charter of the United Nations. The OSCE is still working on the "Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century," NATO is supposed to approve its New Strategic Concept in April 1999, and the EU is developing CFSP; however, the basic features of the system have been agreed upon by the interlocking institutions.

The system's basic features should be as follows:

- NATO will remain a collective defense organization and the cornerstone of the European defense;
- The Europeans will take more responsibility for their own defense and will share more in the NATO expenses. This would be achieved by strengthening the ESDI within NATO;
- The United States will remain committed to European security; and
- The current framework of interlocking institutions will be preserved; however, in the case of the EU/WEU/CJTF it can be streamlined and must be clarified because of different national views.

The New Alliance Strategic Concept, which is to be approved at the forthcoming NATO summit in Washington, will be NATO's guide for the future. It will reflect the changes in security environment that have happened since the current Concept was created. There are two notable events that should be echoed in the New Alliance Strategic Concept. First, with the implosion of the Soviet Union the threat of large-scale aggression against NATO territory has disappeared. All over the world, there is no military power that could even think of challenging NATO. Second, acting outside the NATO area has brought changes in the

¹⁷⁸ Rob de Wijk, *NATO on the Brink of the New Millenium: The Battle for Consensus* (Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries, 1997), 142-5.

role of Alliance's armed forces. Wijk has characterized the possible tasks for developing the new concept as follows:

In addition to bringing its strategy into line with reality, a new political strategy could help to clarify NATO's transformation in the eyes of the Russian Federation, thus making the accession of its former satellites more palatable. In this context, the fundamental security task of "preserving the strategic balance" needs to be replaced. A new fundamental security task could emphasize NATO's shift from threat-based to capabilities-based planning. NATO could express its willingness to preserve sufficient military capabilities for conflict prevention and conflict control, that is for regional collective defense, carrying out peace support operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, and supporting WEU operations undertaken by European allies in pursuit of their CFSP.¹⁷⁹

The new NATO significantly differs from the NATO six years ago, and its place in the international system has also been changing. The next chapter examines the question whether the changing reality has affected the Czech perception of NATO.

¹⁷⁹ Rob de Wijk, *Towards a new political strategy for NATO* (NATO Review, Vol.46, No.2, Summer1998), 14-18.

V. THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND NATO

A. INTRODUCTION

The history of independent Czech Republic began on January 1, 1993 when the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic ceased its existence and split into two independent states: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. From that moment on the Czech policymakers and elite have been leading the Czech Republic towards integration into Western European structures, particularly NATO and the EU.

The Czech public has been largely indifferent to this process. Their attitude has been generally formed by the widespread opinion that there is no external threat to the Czech Republic's security and by two events in the nation's history. The first one was the 1938 Munich Agreement; the second one was the August 21, 1968 Soviet-led invasion, which led to the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Army. Both of these events have common features. First, Czechoslovakia was a victim of a great power's interests. Second, the Czech military did not fight. In 1938, the army was mobilized, but had to give up to Hitler after the politicians had ordered the military to remain in the barracks. In 1968, presidential orders were much the same. In both cases, the military obeyed the politicians however, as a result, the army has been held by the public in low esteem. Furthermore, no third power was willing to fight for small Czechoslovakia.

1. Historical Background

The history of the independent Czechoslovakia commenced on October 28, 1918 when the Czechs and Slovaks established a new state "in the heart of Europe." The new state was born in a very adverse environment. Europe in 1918 was exhausted and destroyed by World War I. Russia was shattered by the 1917 Revolution and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose part the Czech and Slovak lands had been, ceased to exist. At that time European and American statesmen were trying to create a security system that could prevent conflicts in Europe. President Wilson called for a "peace without victory", but the Europeans wanted to establish a system of "balance of power," punish the beaten foe, and get their reparations. The British negotiator was David L. George whose 1918 election slogan gave hint. It was, "We will squeeze the

orange till the pips squeak.”¹⁸⁰ At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, the clash of ideas of President Wilson and his European counterparts occurred. The Europeans did not accept Wilson’s vision. Although he achieved the establishment of the League of Nations, the final organization was so changed by the compromises, that President Wilson was not able to convince the Senate to ratify the treaty, i.e. the United States has never joined the League of Nations, and remained in isolation. Because Germany was not allowed to enter the League till 1926, the Soviet Union did not join the organization till 1934, and Britain did not respect the small powers, the League of Nations became a helpless debating club.

Looking for security, Czechoslovakia entered the “Little Entente,” a collective defense pact, which consisted of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. France, disappointed with the League, signed an alliance with Belgium, Poland, and Little Entente; however, it was clear that France was not strong enough to help its Eastern allies in a case of confrontation with Germany till Britain would contribute as well. The 1925 German-British Rhineland Pact showed the actual British attitude to Eastern Europe and disrespect for the rights of small nations in the newly developing international system.¹⁸¹ Czechoslovakia signed a pact with the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union was not allowed to help Czechoslovakia unless France acted. When fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany took power, the democratic Europe and the United States remained silent in belief that Germany would not wage any war.

a. Munich Agreement

Under these circumstances, it was no wonder that the representatives of the four great powers (Italy, France, Britain, and Germany) signed the Munich Agreement on September 29, 1938.¹⁸² Although the Czechoslovak military had been mobilized and deployed, the Czechoslovak government

¹⁸⁰ Craig, 51.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, 41-56.

¹⁸² The fact that the pact on the Czechs was signed without Czech participation has become the symbol of feelings of the Czech nation about its position in Europe, between the great powers. Saying “About Us Without Us” expresses the naked truth of the 1938-1989 period.

surrendered. The Sudetenland, a part of Czechoslovakia where the Germans constituted majority, was annexed by Nazi Germany. The then Western leaders were proud of saving peace for Europe.

These were two lessons that the Czech nation learned from the 1938 events. First, Czechoslovakia was betrayed by its Western allies. Second, the Czechoslovak army did not resist.

b. From Munich to the Prague Spring

The Munich Agreement was followed by the German occupation of the Czech lands - Bohemia and Moravia - on March 15, 1939. It ended on May 9, 1945.

In 1945, two events happened that spoiled the Czech-German relationship. First, the German population of about three million was expelled from the Sudetenland to Germany. Second, on October 24, 1945 President Benes issued "National Decrees" which served as a legal basis for confiscation of the property of traitors and collaborators with the Nazi regime and also provided a legal framework for nationalization of major industries.

Between 1945 – 1947 Czechoslovakia experienced a short period of democracy. In 1946 the Communist Party won parliamentary elections when it benefited from its strong antifascist reputation. In February 1948, twelve ministers of the governing coalition resigned trying to force President Benes to call for an early parliamentary election. They miscalculated. Weak and sick, President Benes succumbed to the Communist pressure and named Communist candidates as ministers to vacant positions. On February 25, 1948 the post-war period of Czechoslovak democracy was over. The communist totalitarian regime tied Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union. Two generations grew up in an atmosphere of the omnipresent slogans like "The Soviet Union, Our Most Loyal Friend," and "With the Soviet Union Forever."

c. The Prague Spring

In January 1968 the Czechoslovak Communists attempted to reform the regime. The "Prague Spring" was to bring the "Socialism with a Human Face" to Czechoslovakia. Seven months later, on August 21, 1968, the armies of five countries of the Warsaw Treaty invaded Czechoslovakia. The Government was forced to sign the "Agreement on Temporary Stay of the Soviet Army in Czechoslovakia."

Czechoslovak People Army deployed to face the threat of the Western imperialism was not ready to fight the Eastern invasion and it did not fight, and for the next twenty years was closely cooperating with the Soviet Army - de jure Allies, de facto occupants.

The Czechs and Slovaks were given the second historical lesson. Czechoslovakia was occupied by its most important ally, the Czechoslovak military once again did not fight for independence and freedom of the country, and the Western democracies stood on the sidelines again.

B. NATO PERCEPTION AND INTERPRETATION OF NATO ISSUES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

Nelson and Szayna have stated:

The Czech Republic has been probably the least controversial of the NATO aspirants. Geostrategically secure because of its exposed western location, most developed and prosperous of the former Warsaw Pact states, and having developed quickly into a seeming success story (politically and economically), and with a charismatic and world famous figure as president, the Czech Republic was taken almost for granted to be in the first wave of NATO enlargement.¹⁸³

Security and defense issues in general have a low priority among the Czech electorates. There are several reasons for this condition. The lessons of the 1938 and 1968 historical events have been augmented by the end of the Cold War and by the splitting of Czechoslovakia. The physical distance from Russia and friendly western neighbors has given the Czechs a sense of security. As a result, the economic and social issues have become the first priority.

Security policy and NATO perception and interpretation of NATO issues have naturally been different in various social layers and groups. The following paragraphs examine the attitudes of the Czech political elites, public, and military to NATO.

1. Political Elites

The Czech right-wing parties have supported the Czech NATO membership from the first moment on, with the exception of the ultra right Republican Party, which called for disbanding of NATO; however,

¹⁸³ Daniel N. Nelson, Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO's Metamorphosis and Central European Politics: Effects of Alliance Transformation* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 19.

for most of the period since 1993, the Klaus government was not much interested in defense. Economic and social issues have been of the highest priority. The military was largely ignored. The question of NATO integration was seen to be useful only in the sense of furthering the overall goal of integration into the EU. Only when the decision on NATO enlargement was coming up, the problem of defense has gained more attention.

The Social Democrats changed their position. After initially opposing the Czech membership in NATO, they called for a nation-wide referendum on joining NATO; however, they failed to get support of the other political parties. As a ruling party, they warmly welcomed the Czech membership in NATO in March 1999.

The Communist Party has not changed its perception of the world. The Czech Communists have considered NATO to be the tool of imperialism and have been refusing the Czech NATO membership. Communist Chairman Miroslav Grebeníček said in February 1999 that his party would never stop its efforts to convert NATO into an organization that would not be the tool of aggression and expansion of neoimperialist policy. Referring to this declaration, several politicians have expressed their fears of leaking NATO classified information by the communist members of parliament.¹⁸⁴

President Václav Havel has gone through the whole spectrum of opinions about NATO. In March 1985, the then dissident Havel signed a Charter 77 document that called for parallel disbandment of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (WP). In May 1990, Czechoslovak President Havel proposed in the Council of Europe the transformation of both NATO and the WP into a single security system whose basis would be formed by NATO. In 1995 one of Czech President Havel's highest priorities was that of Czech NATO membership. Alexandr Vondra has said, "Without President Havel, the Czech invitation to NATO in the first wave would be questionable." His authority of a moral hero and a philosopher abroad was very helpful,

¹⁸⁴ Jan Gazdík, T.Chundela, "Postoj KSČM vzbuzuje obavy z úniku tajných dat" ("KSČM Attitude Raises Worries of Leaking of the Classified Data") (*iDnes*, 1.3. 1999) Available [Online]: <http://www.idnes.cz/idskosile/domaci.aspx=domaci/clanky/> [3 March 1999]

particularly during his visit to Washington in May 1997, two months before the 1997 NATO Madrid Summit.¹⁸⁵

Although all major political forces with the exception of the Communist Party have supported Czech NATO membership, the important legislature has been delayed.¹⁸⁶ This fact raises questions about political responsibility and integrity of the Czech policymakers.

2. Public and Media

A few weeks before the Czech Republic would join NATO, only 46 per cent of respondents to public polls would support this act. A year ago the support was 55.3 percent. In comparison, the proponents of joining the EU have been constantly above fifty per cent.¹⁸⁷ This ratio is in a harmony with the big picture of the Czech public's priorities. The Czechs are generally either different or hostile to the military and the military pacts. This attitude has been formed by the historical events for several generations, as was mentioned and illustrated above. As Nelson and Szayna have written, "Indeed, the Czechs are probably among the most pacifistic people in all of Europe, with a substantial portion of the Czech electorate questioning the need to have armed forces at all."¹⁸⁸

The position of the military in the Czech society is near to the bottom of the social scale. The shaming picture of the public opinion was illustrated by polls, in which the profession of a soldier was on the 19th out of 20 common occupations. The only one listed lower was that one of cleaning personnel.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁵ Jan Lipold, "Vstup do NATO: Havel v Alianci nevěřil ale brzy změnil názor." ("Joining NATO: Havel Did Not Trust in Alliance But Has Changed His Mind Early") (*MF Dnes*, 28 December 1998, Praha)

¹⁸⁶ Jan Gazdík, "Vláda kývla zákonům, jež zemi posunují k NATO" ("Government Approved Laws Pushing the Country to NATO") (*iDnes*, 28 February 1999) Available [Online]: <<http://www.idnes.cz/fidskosile/domaci.asp?x=domaci/clanky/>> [28 February 1999]

¹⁸⁷ "Vstup do NATO by v referendu podpořilo 46 procent občanů." ("46 per cent of the Citizenry Would Have Supported Czech NATO Membership") (*České Noviny*, 9 February 1999) Available [Online]: <<http://ctk.ceskenoviny.cz/domaci.html>> [9 February 1999]

¹⁸⁸ Nelson & Szayna, 22.

¹⁸⁹ Réka Szemerényi, *Central European Civil-Military Reforms At Risk* (Adelphi Paper 306, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.56. The results of polls were widely discussed in Czech media.

Scandals and corruption cases that have leaked to the public have worsened the situation even more. The scandals have accompanied acquisition of an army information system, parachutes, supersonic fighters, helicopters spare parts, modernization of T-72 tanks, and MIG-29 barter, as well as numerous contracts on catering and heat supplies.

A significant part of the Czech public perceives a membership in NATO as an opportunity for improving the economic rather than the security situation. Many respondents in different polls acknowledge that the most favorable advantage of the Czechs in the NATO membership lies in the area of the foreign investments, creating new jobs, and access to the most modern technologies.

The media contribute to the distorted picture of NATO as well. This can be illustrated by an article of February 27, 1999 in the Czech Press Agency titled "The Czech Army Enters NATO Eight Years After The Warsaw Pact Disbandment." Besides the misleading title, article states that the Czech Government confirmed its will to fulfil all the military commitments resulting from all the articles of the Washington Treaty. Readers who have little idea about NATO's complex activities then necessarily come then to the obvious conclusion that NATO is a military pact and nothing more.¹⁹⁰

Support to the Czech NATO membership is significantly determined by the political orientation of the respondents. According to the polls that have regarded their respondents' political orientation, the highest percentage of the NATO proponents can be found in the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA). The other extreme is represented by the Communist Party where only four per cent of its members support this idea. Other factors effecting the public support of the Czech NATO membership are - in addition to the political orientation - respondents' education and age. Generally, the idea enjoys support of younger people with higher education.

3. Military

During December 1996 and May 1997 the Ministry of Defense carried out a research within the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) in order to find out views of the Czech career soldiers on the ACR and

¹⁹⁰ The article is available [Online]: <<http://ctk.ceske.noviny.cz/CTK!no/43c2.htm>> [27 February 1999]

NATO. From the ACR's point of view, the results of the research were not optimistic at all. 72 % of the career soldiers did not consider the ACR as being prepared to join NATO, and characterized it as an unstable bureaucratic organization unable to change and not accepting new trends in the military science and the society. NATO, on the other hand, was perceived as an active modern developing organization. The research participants described NATO as effective and stable, with democratic principles. NATO was seen as "the light at the end of the tunnel."¹⁹¹

C. DEBATE ON NATO ISSUES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC

In brief, there has been no serious public discussion on the NATO enlargement at all. The Czech Republic has become the NATO member without celebrations. The Czech public has not really paid attention to the fact that it has just experienced the turning point in the Czech history. Because of the generally low interest in the defense issues, the Czech government has had no incentive to conduct any educational campaign. Furthermore, because of the general indifference to the defense issues in the Czech Republic, there appears to be little understanding of responsibilities that come along with NATO membership both at the popular and even at some higher levels.¹⁹² This does not pose any serious problem at the present. With the deepening of the crisis of the Czech economy (the GNP decreased by 2.7% in 1998), the willingness to pay enlargement burden at the expense of social programs would disappear. Another problem could arise in a case of heavier Czech losses in a NATO mission. The Czech public is simply not prepared to accept such events. The NATO opponents present arguments to which the Czech public is highly sensitive. In an extreme case, the opponents could legally take power in the Czech Republic and consequently paralyze NATO decision-making processes.

¹⁹¹ Štefan Sarvaš, "Pohledy české veřejnosti a vojáků z povolání na vstup ČR do NATO" ("The Czech Public and Career Soldiers' Views on the CR's Entering NATO") (*NATO: dokumenty - informace - názory - komentáře*. Srpen 1997, Praha), 52-53.

¹⁹² Nelson & Szayna, 23.

D. CONCLUSION

The great part of the Czech population has traditionally conceived the military as not necessary and of the security of small nations as being in the hands of great powers. With the NATO membership, the Czech Republic has been given the opportunity to become a part of the most stable and strongest collective defense organization in the world, which has given the Czech Republic historically unique security guarantee. President Havel said after signing the accession documents that in joining NATO, the Czech Republic committed itself to share responsibility for freedom of nations, human rights, democratic values, and peace in Europe. In other words, strong guarantees are accompanied by strong commitments. Unfortunately, not all consequences are well understood at both the popular and political elite levels. There is a gap between reality and common consciousness in the Czech Republic that should be bridged. Since there are only a few non-governmental institutions capable of fulfilling this task, it must be done by the government.

The Czech Republic should take lessons from the process of getting ready for the NATO membership. The most obvious flaws have been in the legislative area and in the military's acquisition and human resources policies. The Czech Republic should avoid the repetition of these errors in the process of joining the EU. NATO demands that the members be highly active and be able both to compete and cooperate. This could be extremely helpful in the future integration processes.

VI. CONCLUSION

The collapse of the Communist system in 1989-90 changed the European security environment. The bipolar world of clear threats was superseded by the unipolar one where the threats have been smaller and hard to recognize. Margaret Thatcher has said, "The Europe that has emerged from behind the Iron Curtain has many of the features of the Europes of 1914 and 1939: ethnic strife, contested borders, political extremism, nationalist passions and economic backwardness."¹⁹³ Several of those dilemmas have become open armed conflicts; after 1989 a few of former communist countries from behind the Iron Curtain have tried to solve their both external and internal disputes by use of force. The most dangerous events that can destabilize the whole region have taken place in former Yugoslavia.

Developed democratic countries in Western Europe never even contemplated settling their disputes by use of the military. This is the state of affairs to strive for throughout Europe. In order to bring peace and security to the whole continent, NATO (and the EU) have to gradually bring into the fold every European country sharing the same values – pluralistic democracy, respects for human and civil rights, ethnic tolerance, religious diversity, and rule of law, and that impose civilian control over the military.¹⁹⁴ No proponent of the open NATO and the EU to the new democracies maintains that the process of enlargement will be smooth, but that does not undermine the case for spreading the benefits of the Western security community eastward to those who adhere to its principles¹⁹⁵.

To fulfill these tasks, NATO had to do two things: survive the end of the Cold War and undergo profound transformation. Shortly after the Cold War, two strong opinions emerged in the world politics that NATO should either dissolve or become a collective security organization. Alliances are usually built as

¹⁹³ Margaret Thatcher cited in Yost, 191.

¹⁹⁴ Opening these organizations has brought a few positive results. Several states, for example Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine have modified their behavior in their efforts to access them. They have settled their disputes over minority rights and borders. Estonia and Latvia both softened their attitudes toward their Russian minorities.

¹⁹⁵ Jane M. O. Sharp, "Spreading the Security Blanket." Available [Online]:
<<http://www.bullatomi.org/issues/1998/jf98/jf98sharp.htm>> [20 February 1999]

temporary tools, as systems in which states cooperate to enhance security against actors perceived to pose a threat. The alliance usually disbands when once the objectives are achieved and the clear enemy disappears. NATO seems to be an exception to this realist rule. There are two explanations for that. First, as the pure institutionalists argue, NATO has behaved as any large bureaucratic organization, i.e. NATO itself has resisted disbandment and has preferred a transformation to dissolution. This explanation, however, is too simplistic. Second, a complex one, offers hegemonic leadership, preserved credibility, right domestic politics and elite manipulation, high institutionalization, and ideological solidarity, shared identities and security communities as reasons that have led to NATO's survival.¹⁹⁶ Summarized, NATO has survived because the United States has maintained a strong position in the Alliance, the Allies have shared similar political values, and the Alliance has been highly institutionalized¹⁹⁷. If there were still any voices calling for NATO disbandment in 1995, they were silenced by the war in former Yugoslavia. NATO was the only organization capable of stopping bloodshed.

The tasks brought to NATO by enormous changes could not be fulfilled by NATO that existed in 1989. The first phase of transformation began with the 1990 "hand of friendship" and concluded with the March 1999 enlargement, which coincided with NATO's 50th Anniversary. In 1997 in Washington Václav Havel proclaimed that the expansion of NATO would finally mark the end of an "endlessly confusing" post-Cold War period, and the start of the new period. Havel emphasized the same security threats as Margaret Thatcher did: economic backwardness, terrorism and nationalism, and to these he added tensions between states, nations and nation states. Havel said that NATO expansion was the first step on the long journey to a new and secure Europe. He expressed his conviction that through NATO expansion, security could be structured in the new world.¹⁹⁸ In other words, NATO enlargement could help to spread Western security concepts to the rest of the world. The new phase of transformation will begin at the 1999 NATO's 50th

¹⁹⁶ Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse" (*Survival*, vol. 39, no. 1. Spring 1997), 164.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 170.

¹⁹⁸ Georgie A. Geyer, "Czech President Believes NATO Expansion Marks New Era." Available [Online]: <http://www.unexpress.com/ups/opinion/column/gg/text/1997/10/gg971014.html> > [12 March 1999]

Anniversary Washington Summit where the New Strategic Concept will be adopted to set NATO guidelines for the 21st century.

On 21 June 1996 in Warsaw, Václav Havel said that the disappearance of the strategic enemy presented NATO with an opportunity to push forward, without giving an inch, its essential principles and the values it protected, and that NATO then should define itself as a main guarantor of peace and stability within the Euro-Atlantic area¹⁹⁹. However, such a strict approach could bring severe dilemmas. Russia and some post-Soviet republics could become serious problems in the near future. While Georgia welcomed the enlargement, Lukashenko, the President of Belarus, declared that, due to NATO enlargement, Belarus deliberated the return of nuclear weapons to its territory. His idea was then welcomed by Roman Popkovic, Chairman of the Belarus Duma Defense Committee.²⁰⁰

The New NATO, which is supposed to be defined in April 1999, will have to cope with the turbulent security environment that will demand strong cooperation of all relevant security institutions. These organizations are working on their new concepts that will determine the way the interlocking institutions will coordinate their efforts in the system of cooperative security in Europe. The picture of the system is still blurred, but its basic features are clear. In the given circumstances, the United States must remain committed to European security and NATO must maintain its collective defense function; the Europeans have to take more responsibility for their own defense and share more in the NATO expenses through strengthening the ESDI within NATO; the current framework of interlocking institutions must be preserved and enhanced by better defining mutual relations and obligations within the system.

The Czech Republic became the NATO member on 12 March 1999. Unfortunately, the Czech public does not have a clear idea about today's North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The 1999 Government Report has stated that Czech politicians did not satisfactorily explain the reasons for the Czech accession to

¹⁹⁹ Havel's speech at the Conference on politico-military decision making process of NATO in Warsaw, 21 June 1996. Available [Online]: <<http://www.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1996/2106.html>> [4 March 1999]

²⁰⁰ Petra Procházková, "Lukašenko si chce nechat jaderné zbraně" ("Lukashenko Wants Nukes Again") (*Lidové noviny*, 26. února 1997, Praha). Available [Online]: <[wysiwyg:clanek.133/http://www.trafika.cz/in/1999/990226/in77456254.htm](http://www.wysiwyg:clanek.133/http://www.trafika.cz/in/1999/990226/in77456254.htm)> [28 February 1999]

NATO. The Czechs must learn a lot to understand and appreciate the level of security they got. But, they also have to realize that there is no free lunch and the Czech Republic cannot become a mere consumer of security. The Czech Republic must share the burden. The public should understand that the enlargement of NATO did not take place because of security interests of the three countries. It was Germany's interest in stability on its eastern border that drove the Alliance to consider accepting new members. The Clinton administration initially resisted pressure to open NATO, but later the attempt of the anti-Gorbachev coup in Moscow and the Bosnia events shifted the opinion. The national interests of the United States, as the main determinant in formation of NATO policies, then became the main factor in the process of the 1999 enlargement.

NATO membership could become a decisive step for overcoming the perception of some kind of isolation of the Czech Republic from Western Europe, and help to cultivate the Czech political scene and behavior. On the other hand, this also is a challenge to the Czech nation. This presents the Czechs with an opportunity to prove that they do belong to the West, to its culture, and that they share its values. The opportunity can come in a very short time. NATO's participation in the solution of the Balkans crisis, for example, can become a proving ground, and then the debate about NATO could have begun too late; the Czech Republic could very easily lose its reputation of being a reliable ally and negatively influence the next NATO enlargement.

The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland should carefully analyze the process of their accession to NATO for to help other prospective NATO members to avoid mistakes that they as new members made on their way to the Alliance. Also, these analyses could help to transform societies in the states that expressed their interest in becoming members of the European Union.

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